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Are Security Deposits "Security Interests"?
The Proper Scope of Article 9 and Statutory
Interpretation in Consumer Class Actions
R. Wilson Freyermuth"
Assume that Jane Doe leases an automobile from a General Motors dealer,
pursuant to a lease contract under which Jane makes a cash security deposit.
Under the lease, the lessor agrees to "refund" the deposit at the conclusion of the
lease term in the event that Jane fully performs her obligations under the lease.
Is this transaction governed by Article 9-i.e., has the lessor taken a "security
interest" in Jane's cash deposit to secure Jane's obligations under the lease
agreement?
A cursory review of the text of Article 9 suggests that Jane's lessor would
hold a possessory security interest in Jane's deposit. The official 1972 text
(applicable prior to July 1, 2001) provided that Article 9 applied "to any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security interest
in personal property or fixtures."' In turn, Section 1-201(37) defines "security
interest" as "an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment
or performance of an obligation."2 Read together, these two provisions appear
to encompass an automobile lease security deposit. When the automobile lessor
contracts for and receives a cash security deposit from Jane, the lessor has taken
an "interest" in Jane's "personal property." Furthermore, the security deposit
unquestionably secures Jane's obligation as lessee to make the bargained-for
lease payments and to maintain the physical condition of the automobile. As a
result, it appears that Jane's lessor has taken a possessory security interest in the
deposited funds and that Article 9 would govern the parameters of the lessor's
rights and responsibilities with respect to this deposit. Certainly, those of us who

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. I am grateful
to Hank Chambers, Jim Devine, Mike Floyd, and Bill Henning for helpful thoughts on
an earlier draft of this article, and to Chris Guthrie for the conversation referenced at the
beginning of Part II. I also wish to thank Robert L. Cope, Lawrence G. Crahan, Linda
S. Legg, and the law firm of Armstrong, Teasdale, Schlafly & Davis for their generous
financial support for the University of Missouri Law School Foundation and this
research.
1. U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(a) (1972). During the 1990s, Article 9 underwent a
comprehensive revision, promulgated in 1999 (with technical corrections promulgated
in January 2000) and effective in all 50 states as of July 1, 2001. The scope provision of
revised Article 9 is as broad as (if not broader than) the scope provision of the 1972 text.
Revised Article 9 applies to a "transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security
interest in personal property or fixtures by contract." U.C.C. § R9-109(a)(l) (2000). In
this article, citations to revised Article 9 will be indicated by the prefix R9.
2. U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1999).
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teach Article 9 would expect (or hope for) our students to evaluate the situation
precisely this way.
Nevertheless, while the textual analysis of this hypothetical seems
straightforward, recent case law has surprisingly trended toward the opposite
conclusion. In the past five years alone, courts in Alabama,3 Illinois,4 Kentucky, 5
Minnesota, 6 New York,7 Ohio, 8 and Wisconsin 9 have concluded that the lessor's
taking of a security deposit does not create a security interest in the deposited
funds. What explains a set of decisions so profoundly and consistently at odds
with the text of Article 9's broad scope provisions?
To make any sense of these recent decisions, one must first appreciate the
context in which these disputes typically arise. If Jane's security deposit is
treated as Article 9 "collateral"'" subject to a possessory security interest in favor
of Jane's lessor, then Article 9's baseline rules" will generally govern the rights
and responsibilities of Jane's lessor with respect to the deposited funds. Article
9's baseline rules provide that if a secured party holds a possessory security
interest in collateral and receives a monetary return on that collateral, the secured
party must either apply this return against the debt or remit it to the debtor, unless
the parties' own agreement expressly provides otherwise. 2 Thus, if Jane Doe's

3. Yeager v. GMAC, 719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998).
4. Spina v. Toyota Motor Credit Corp., 703 N.E.2d 484 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
5. Lawson v. Bank One, Lexington, N.A., 35 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ky. 1997).
6. Rosen v. PRIMUS Auto. Fin. Servs., 618 N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
7. In re Ford Motor Credit Co. Motor Vehicle Lease Litig., No. 95 CIV. 1876, 1998
WL 159051 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1998).
8. Dolan v. GMAC, 739 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Knight v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 735 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
9. Doe v. GMAC, 635 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
10. Article 9 defines "collateral" as "the property subject to a security interest."
U.C.C. § 9-105(l)(c) (1972); U.C.C. § R9-102(a)(12) (2000).
11. In contract law, one typically would use the term "default rule" to identify the
rule that would govern the parties' rights and responsibilities absent a contrary agreement
between the parties. This terminology could produce confusion in the Article 9 context,
where the term "default rule" could also refer to a rule or principle that might apply in
the event of the debtor's default under its security agreement. This Article uses the term
"baseline rule" instead of "default rule" in order to avoid any such confusion.
12. U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(c) (1972). The 1972 text provided that "[u]nless otherwise
agreed, when collateral is in the secured party's possession ... the secured party may
hold as additional security any increase or profits (except money) received from the
collateral, but money so received, unless remitted to the debtor, shall be applied in
reduction of the secured obligation." Id. Revised Article 9 rearticulates this same basic
standard in slightly modified language: "a secured party having possession of collateral
•..shall apply money or funds received from the collateral to reduce the secured
obligation, unless remitted to the debtor." U.C.C. § R9-207(c)(2) (2000).
Section R9-207(c) does not contain the "unless otherwise agreed" language used
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lessor placed her security deposit in an interest-bearing deposit account, and the
security deposit is Article 9 "collateral," then the lessor must either apply the
interest earned by that deposit to reduce Jane's lease obligation or pay that
earned interest to Jane-again, unless the parties have opted out of Article 9's
baseline rules through contrary lease provisions 3 (or unless some other positive
law governs payment of interest on the deposit).' 4

in the 1972 text to signal that the parties could contract out of these baseline rules.
Nevertheless, the comments to Section R9-207(c) make clear that the quoted language
merely establishes "rules following common-law precedents which apply unless the
parties otherwise agree." U.C.C. § R9-207 cmt. 3 (2000).
Because there is no meaningful difference between Section 9-20 7 (2)(c) of the 1972
text and revised Section R9-207(c)(2), the analysis of the issues presented in the security
deposit cases would not differ depending upon whether a particular dispute was governed
by Revised Article 9 or the 1972 text. For purposes of conciseness, this article generally
will refer simply to "Section 9-207" without distinguishing between the 1972 text and
Revised Article 9.
13. As discussed in the text accompanying notes 61-66, infra, Article 9 does not
impose on the secured party any affirmative obligation to invest the collateral so as to
earn a monetary return. It merely requires that the secured party must account for any
monetary return actually received, unless the parties have contracted otherwise.
14. State statutes could effectively pre-empt the potential application of Section 9207 relative to the issue of interest on security deposits. Statutes in some states place an
immutable positive obligation upon certain lessors to pay interest to the lessee upon the
lessee's security deposit. For example, see infra note 67 for a list of state statutes
requiring landlords to pay interest upon tenant security deposits.
In the consumer lease context, very few presently existing state statutes have
expressly resolved the interest-on-security-deposit question. Illinois requires that any
consumer lessor must place any security deposit in a bank account holding only security
deposits, and further provides that if that account bears interest, such interest must be
paid "to the party entitled to the deposit at the end of the lease" (the tenant, assuming no
default) if the deposit was $150 or more. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 165/3 (1999). Under
New York law, if a personal property lease agreement has a term of 120 days or longer
and requires a deposit of $750 or more, the lessor must place the deposit in an interestbearing account; all interest earned belongs to the lessee with the exception of an
administrative fee (1% of the deposited amount) that the lessor may impose. N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 7-101 (1), (1-a) (McKinney Supp. 2002). The landlord cannot disclaim this
obligation in the lease. Id. § 7-101(2). In all other cases, any interest actually earned by
the lessor must be paid to the lessee (after the allowed administrative fee). Id. § 7-101 (1).
By contrast, Wisconsin statutes make clear that the holder of a security deposit under a
consumer lease need not pay interest on a security deposit. WIS. STAT. ANN. §
429.203(9) (West 1998).
In February 2002, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws promulgated the Uniform Consumer Leases Act, which (if adopted by a state)
would appear to establish that the lessor in a consumer lease need not pay interest on a
security deposit. Uniform Consumer Leases Act § 303(d) (2002).
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Accordingly, if Jane's lease is silent on the subject and the lessor has
actually earned a monetary return on Jane's deposit during the lease term, Jane
might well demand that the lessor return her deposit with interest earned at the
conclusion of the lease term. If the lessor refused, Jane would have little
financial incentive to seek individual legal action to compel payment of interest;
the legal costs associated with such an action would far exceed the amount of
interest earned on Jane's relatively small deposit." However, Jane might instead
choose to proceed via a consumer class action, on behalf of herself and all other
similarly situated lessees-allowing Jane to assert a collective claim that no
individual lessee could pursue efficiently.
Nevertheless, if Jane attempts to bring a consumer class action seeking to
vindicate her claim to collect interest earned on her security deposit, the trend of
recent decisions suggests that Jane's attempt will fail. As noted above, recent
decisions in at least seven states have concluded that Article 9 does not apply to
a lessor's security deposit, on the theory that a security deposit creates merely a
"debt" rather than a security interest. These courts have consistently concluded
that Article 9's baseline rules regarding monetary returns on collateral do not
apply to lease security deposits, and that instead the lessor's responsibility is
governed by common law principles-under which the lessor need not pay
interest on security deposits absent an express statutory obligation or a contrary
contractual agreement to do so.
Part I of this article critiques this strand of decisions (referred to collectively
throughout the article as the "security deposit cases") and demonstrates that the
cases rest upon a flawed understanding of Article 9's scope provisions. In these
cases, courts have borrowed landlord-tenant law's traditional distinction between
a "debt" and a "pledge"-a distinction used in landlord-tenant law to justify a
baseline rule under which title to a security deposit passes entirely to the
landlord, with the landlord having no positive duty to invest the deposit or pay
interest to the tenant.' 6 As Part I explains, the security deposit cases wrongly
conclude that the drafters of Article 9 intended to incorporate this distinction and
exclude lease security deposits from Article 9's scope. As Part I demonstrates,
the reasoning of these cases necessarily exalts form over substance to a level that
one cannot reconcile with Article 9's scope provisions-the interpretation of
which should be guided by economic substance rather than form. 7 As Part I
concludes, courts should treat lease security deposits as Article 9 security
interests and resolve the "interest on security deposits" issue by reference to

15. For example, if the lessor of a vehicle for a three-year term invested a $300
security deposit in an account earning a 4% annual return, this deposit would earn
roughly $37.50, depending upon the method of compounding.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 22-68.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 69-77.
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Section 9-207 (except where other positive law or the parties' contrary
agreement displace Section 9-207's applicability). 8
Properly treating lease security deposits as security interests, however,
should not have produced a different ultimate result in most of the security
deposit cases. Even assuming Article 9 governs security deposits, the courts
should have denied recovery to plaintiff lessees in the security deposit cases on
alternative grounds.' 9 Further, as noted above, lessors can readily contract out
of any liability for paying interest on security deposits (unless legislation other
than Article 9 imposes a positive nonwaivable duty to pay interest). Finally,
recently proposed uniform consumer leasing legislation would (if adopted)
relieve consumer lessors from any obligation to pay interest on security deposits.
As such, why should anyone care about the improper analysis present in the
security deposit cases?
In addressing this question, Part II explores the possibility that the security
deposit cases reflect latent judicial bias over perceived abuse of the consumer
class action device and judicial frustration with the lack of legislative solutions
to these perceived abuses.20 As Part II explains, this speculation appears
consistent with other contexts in which anti-consumer class action bias appears
(at least anecdotally) to have influenced statutory interpretation in consumer
class action disputes.2' As a result, further empirical study may be useful to
indicate whether anti-consumer class action bias systematically influences
statutory interpretation generally (i.e., not just in UCC decisions), and what
implications such a bias should have for legislative reforms.
I. THE SECURITY DEPOSIT CASES (AND WHY THEY'RE WRONG)
Since 1997, courts in at least seven states have concluded that Article 9
does not apply to security deposits created under an automobile lease.22 The
various cases are factually similar, and each is roughly comparable to the
hypothetical set forth in the introduction. Many of the decisions merely rely
upon earlier opinions in other states, without undertaking significant independent
analysis. Thus, rather than summarize all of the decisions, Part L.A looks at two
18. See infra text accompanying notes 78-112.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 79-111.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 113-56.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 157-92.
22. See Yeager v. GMAC, 719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998); Spina v. Toyota Motor
Credit Corp., 703 N.E.2d 484 (Il. App. Ct. 1998); Lawson v. Bank One, Lexington,
N.A., 35 F. Supp. 2d 961 (E.D. Ky. 1997); Rosen v. PRIMUS Auto. Fin. Servs., 618
N.W.2d 606 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000); In re Ford Motor Credit Co. Motor Vehicle Lease
Litig., No. 95 CIV. 1876, 1998 WL 159051 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1998); Dolan v. GMAC,
739 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Knight v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 735 N.E.2d 513
(Ohio Ct. App. 2000); Doe v. GMAC, 635 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001).
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of these decisions-Knight v. Ford Motor Credit Co.23 and Yeager v.
GMA C---in which state courts have attempted to provide an analytical defense
for excluding security deposits from Article 9.25 In Part I.B, the article critiques
these decisions, demonstrating how courts have inappropriately borrowed from
landlord-tenant law to reach the unjustified conclusion that Article 9 excludes
security deposits from its scope. In Part I.C, the article explains why the
misinterpretation of Article 9's scope provisions in the security deposit cases is
particularly egregious-in fact, a correct application of Article 9's provisions
would impose no liability upon the typical automobile lessor/assignee, if its
behavior in handling security deposits is consistent with customary industry
practices. As a result, Part I concludes that there is no apparent functional reason
for courts to adopt the incorrect interpretation of Sections 1-201(37) and 9-207
reflected in the security deposit cases.
A. Representative Security Deposit Cases
1. Knight v. FordMotor Credit Co.
In 1995, Michael A. Knight leased a Ford Windstar from Ed Mullinax Ford
in Amherst, Ohio, executing a lease that provided for a $225 security deposit.26
Mullinax assigned the lease to Ford Motor Credit Company ("Ford"). At a date
unspecified by the court (but presumably upon conclusion of the lease), Knight
sued to recover sums earned on his security deposit under Ohio's version of
Section 9-207 and sought class certification on behalf of similarly situated
lessees.28 Knight argued that the security deposit was personal property
belonging to him, and that its purpose was to secure payment or performance of
his obligations under the lease.29 As a result, Knight argued, the deposit was "a
security interest under Ohio law" and Section 9-207 therefore governed Ford's
responsibilities with respect to that deposit.3" The trial court rejected Knight's
argument and granted summary judgment for Ford.
The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that Knight's security
deposit did not create a "security interest" governed by Article 9, but instead

23. 735 N.E.2d 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
24. 719 So. 2d 210 (Ala. 1998).

25. See infra text accompanying notes 26-50.
26. Knight, 735 N.E.2d at 514. Knight did not actually pay this amount by cash or
check; rather, he received a credit for that sum based upon the stipulated value of his
trade-in vehicle.
27. Id.

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 516.
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merely a "debt" governed by Ohio common law. The court observed that "[tlo
hold that a security deposit creates a security interest, i.e., a pledge, would
derogate the common law principle that a security deposit instead creates only
a debt."'" For this principle, the court cited the venerable treatise Friedman on
Leases, which states that under landlord-tenant law, "[i]n most cases a security
deposit has been held to create a debtor-creditor relation between landlord and
tenant"3 and that in such a relationship "there is no implied obligation to pay
interest on the deposit."" The Knight court reasoned that this common law
principle was so well-established that Article 9's drafters had to have been
understood to have incorporated it into Section 9-207. The court also noted that
Ohio's version of UCC Article 2A governing lease contracts placed no explicit
positive duty upon lessors to pay interest on security deposits, and from this fact
the Knight court drew what it considered the logical negative inference-that if
the Ohio legislature had intended to obligate lessors to pay lessees interest on
security deposits, it would have done so expressly:
When the General Assembly has intended to impose an obligation to
pay interest on security deposits, it has done so explicitly and not in an
oblique manner as the plaintiff contends was done in [Section 9207(2)]. Therefore, we conclude that it was not the legislative intent
that lessors of automobile leases be obligated to pay the lessee interest
or profits earned on the security deposits.3 4
As a result, the Knight court-relying extensively upon the weight of prior
decisions in other jurisdictions--concluded that Article 9 did not displace the
common law distinction between a "debt" and a "pledge." Further, the court
concluded that in adopting Section 9-207(2), the Ohio legislature essentially
accepted (and incorporated) the common law principle that a security deposit
creates only a debt-thereby relieving the lessor of any duty to pay interest on
that deposit.

31. Id. at 517.

32. 2 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 20.4, at 1291 (4th ed. 1997).
33. Id. § 20.4, at 1292.
34. Knight, 735 N.E.2d at 516 (citing OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 5321.16 (1989)
(requiring interest on real property lease security deposits in certain conditions); id. §
3733.18 (1999) (requiring interest on manufactured home park and marina rental security
deposits)).
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2. Yeager v. GMAC
In May 1995, Richard Yeager leased an automobile from Solomon
Chevrolet ("Solomon") and made a refundable security deposit of $350 pursuant
to the lease. The lease provided, in pertinent part:
29. SECURITY DEPOSIT. A refundable security deposit may be
part of the payment you make when you sign this Lease. We will
deduct from the security deposit any amounts you owe under this
Lease and do not pay. After the end of this Lease, we will refund to
you any part of the security deposit that is left."
Solomon assigned the lease to GMAC. The opinion does not explain whether
GMAC took possession of the security deposit, or whether either GMAC or
Solomon actually invested the deposit in an interest-bearing account.36
In June 1996, Yeager sued GMAC and Solomon on behalf of himself and
similarly situated lessees, alleging that Alabama's version of Section 9-207
obligated GMAC and Solomon to pay Yeager interest on his security deposit.3 7

35. Yeager v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 719 So. 2d 210,210 (Ala. 1998).
36. Other decisions indicate that GMAC has followed differing practices. In Doe
v. GMAC, the opinion states that GMAC placed the deposit in question "into a noninterest bearing account and commingled it with other GMAC funds." Doe v. GMAC,
635 N.W.2d 7,9 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001). By contrast, in Dolan v. GMAC, GMAC argued
that it never took possession of the deposit; instead, it argued that it merely credited the
deposit against GMAC's purchase of the lease and the vehicle from the lessor. Dolan v.
GMAC, 739 N.E.2d 848, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000). This latter approach is consistent
with the typical practice of Ford Motor Credit Company, as described in Knight v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., 735 N.E.2d 513, 514-15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000):
Ford Credit states that it receives no money for motor vehicle lease security
deposits. Plaintiff's payment of a security deposit to the dealer creates a debt
that the dealer and, after assignment, Ford Credit owes plaintiff as lessee.
That debt is transferred from the dealer to Ford Credit by means of the
discount Ford Credit pays the dealer in purchasing the leased automobile. The
amount Ford Credit pays to the dealer in purchasing the leased automobile is
discounted by the amount of the security deposit and the first month's lease
payment paid by a lessee to the dealer. Ford Credit never receives possession
of a check or other tangible form of payment representing plaintiffs lease
security deposit.
Id. at 518.
37. Yeager also alleged that GMAC and Solomon breached the disclosure
requirements of the Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667a (2000), by failing to
disclose that they would not pay interest on Yeager's security deposit. The disclosure
provision in 15 U.S.C. § 1667a does not expressly mandate disclosure with regard to
handling of security deposits or payment of interest on such deposits. Only one court
decision has interpreted the Consumer Leasing Act to require disclosure regarding
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Yeager argued that Article 9 defines a "security interest" as "an interest in
personal property ...that secures payment or performance of an obligation," and
that "personal property" includes "money." Further, Yeager argued that the
terms of the lease and the use of the label "security deposit" demonstrated that
Solomon and GMAC intended for the $350 deposit to secure Yeager's
obligations under the lease. Yeager thus asserted that the deposit constituted a
possessory security interest in Yeager's money-thereby implicating Section 9207(2) and obligating GMAC to remit to Yeager (or apply to the debt) any
money "received from the collateral."38 In support of his argument, Yeager
pointed to federal court decisions in Illinois39 and New York4" holding that
Section 9-207 applied to security deposits under automobile leases.
In their answer, GMAC and Solomon argued that although the lease
contract specified that the funds constituted a "deposit" subject to "refund,"' the
lease contract actually transferred outright ownership of the funds to
Solomon-with the result that Yeager retained no legal interest whatsoever in
the deposited funds. Instead, the defendants argued, Yeager merely "held a
contract right to have an equivalent amount of money, or some lesser amount,
returned to him at the termination of the lease."42 According to the defendants,
the deposit created only a "debt," not a "pledge of collateral," and the lease in no
way indicated any intention to create a security interest in the deposited funds.
The defendants thus argued that the deposit could not constitute "collateral"
within the meaning of Article 9, that Section 9-207 did not govern their rights
and responsibilities with respect to the deposit, and that the lessor had no
3
obligation under Alabama common law to pay interest on a security deposit.

payment of interest on security deposits, see Werbosky v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 38
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 596 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), and the same court later reversed its decision.
See In re Ford Motor Credit Co. Motor Vehicle Lease Litig., No. 95 CIV. 1876, 1998 WL
159051 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1998).
38. Yeager, 719 So. 2d at 211.
39. Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., 924 F. Supp. 894 (N.D. I11.
1997).
1996); Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., 953 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Ill.
The Demitropoulos case is one of the only recent cases (and the only one not later
overruled) in which the court correctly analyzed a security deposit as being within the
scope of Article 9.
40. Werbosky v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 38 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (CBC) 596
(S.D.N.Y. 1996). Although the district court in Werbosky initially ruled that a security
deposit created a "security interest" governed by Article 9, the same court later reversed
this ruling and concluded that under New York law, a lease security deposit created only
a debt rather than a security interest. In re Ford Motor Credit Co. Motor Vehicle Lease
Litig., No. 95 CIV. 1976, 1998 WL 159051, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1998).
41. See supra text accompanying note 35.
42. Yeager, 719 So. 2d at 21!.
43. Id. at 210.
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and the
Alabama Supreme Court unanimously affirmed."
In contrast to the decision in Knight-which, like most of the security
deposit cases, concluded as a matter of law that Article 9 does not apply to a
lease security deposit-the Yeager court suggested that the dispute presented a
question of fact: did the parties' lease agreement manifest a sufficient intention
to create a security interest in the deposit? If so, the Yeager court suggested,
then Article 9 would apply.4" In this regard, the court's approach in Yeager was
consistent with existing Alabama Supreme Court precedent in GeneralElectric
Credit Corp. v. Alford & Assocs.,46 where the court held that Section 9-207
governed reserve accounts held on deposit by GECC under a retail financing
agreement.47 Nevertheless, the Yeager court distinguished Alford on the
merits-concluding that while the agreement in Alford had "specifically"
expressed the parties' intention to create a security interest in the reserve
accounts, Yeager's automobile lease lacked any such "specific" expression of
intent:
If no such intent is specifically expressed in the agreement, then no
security interest is created .... [W]e find no such intent specifically
expressed in the language of the lease agreement executed between
Yeager, GMAC, and Solomon Chevrolet. The language of the lease,
with respect to security deposits, does not expressly and specifically
48
indicate that the parties intended to create a security agreement.

44. Id. at 213.
45. Id. at 212-13.
46. 374 So. 2d 1316 (Ala. 1979).
47. The plaintiff in Alford operated a mobile home sales business for which GECC
provided both wholesale and retail financing. Id. at 1318. The retail financing agreement
provided that GECC could establish "a time sales security reserve or such other reserve
or reserves" as GECC deemed necessary, as security for Alford's performance under the
financing agreements. Id. at 1319. When GECC later terminated the wholesale
agreement and sued for sums allegedly unpaid pursuant to that agreement, Alford argued
that GECC was obligated to credit to Alford whatever sums GECC had earned on the
reserve accounts. Id. The Alford court agreed, concluding that "[t]he intent to create a
security interest in the reserve funds is specifically spelled out in the retail financing
agreement, wherein it is stated: 'It is agreed that such reserves are to be held as security
for and not in lieu of performance."' Id. at 1322. The Alford court, thus, held that "the
record shows a clear and unequivocal intention to create a security interest in personal
property (i.e., money)," and that Section 9-207(2) obligated GECC to account to Alford
for profits earned on the reserve accounts. Id. at 1322-23.
48. Yeager, 719 So. 2d at 213 (emphasis added).
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The Yeager court thus concluded that Section 9-207 did not apply to Yeager's
security deposit, which was, therefore, governed by Alabama common
law-under which the lessor had no positive obligation to pay interest on the
deposit.49 The court thus affirmed the summaryjudgment in favor of GMAC and
Solomon."
B. Critiquingthe Security Deposit Cases
NeitherKnight nor Yeager makes a compelling argument for the conclusion
that Article 9 excludes lease security deposits from the scope of its coverage.
Like Yeager and the other recent security deposit decisions, Knight placed
determinative significance upon the distinction between a "pledge" and a "debt."
The court in Knight viewed these characterizations to be mutually
exclusive-either the security deposit is a "pledge" (with the lessor holding an
Article 9 security interest in the deposit) or it is a "only a debt" (to which Article
9 does not apply). There are three problems with this conclusion. First, the court
misunderstood the context in which this pledge/debt distinction developed, and,
thus, misapplied the distinction to the facts of the dispute in Knight." Second,
regardless of the status of the pledge/debt distinction under landlord-tenant law,
the distinction becomes irrelevant within the framework of Article 9, because the
52
Third,
plain terms of Article 9 sweep security deposits within its scope.
uncritical acceptance of the traditional common law "no-interest-on-securitydeposit" rule has discouraged courts from engaging in serious economic analysis
of whether that remains an appropriate baseline rule in interpreting consumer
leases.5 3

1. The Historical Origins of the Pledge/Debt Distinction
While there is a consistent body of pre-Code law holding that a security
deposit creates merely a debt as distinguished from a pledge, it is important to
understand the context in which landlord-tenant law developed that distinction.
Traditionally, landlords commingled security deposits with their own funds and
used security deposits (and any income earned on such deposits) for their own
accounts. In evaluating legal challenges to such landlord conduct, common law
courts articulated three different approaches-characterizing the transaction as
creating either a "trust," a "pledge," or a "debt."

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id.
See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
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A very few courts treated security deposits as presumptively establishing a
trust of tenant property, with the landlord's responsibilities relating to the deposit
governed by trust law principles. Under this view, a landlord's commingling and
use of a security deposit for its own account would presumptively violate the
tenant's property rights in that deposit. Furthermore, trust law would oblige the
landlord/trustee to invest the deposit for the benefit of the tenant, and would hold
the landlord/trustee liable for its failure to do so. Because leases typically did not
establish an express trust relationship with respect to the security deposit-and
given the practical difficulty associated with viewing the landlord-tenant
relationship as fiduciary in nature-very few common law decisions
characterized a security deposit as a trust. 4
Alternatively, a slightly larger number of courts treated the security deposit
as a "pledge" of the tenant's property-with the landlord's responsibilities
respecting that deposit being governed by the common law relating to pledges.
Under this view, advanced principally by New Jersey and California decisions,"
the landlord could legally commingle the deposit with its own operating funds.
Further, the landlord as pledgee was under no positive duty to invest the deposit
to earn interest on the tenant's behalf. Nevertheless, under the law governing
pledges, the landlord could not permanently dispose of the deposit (at least for
any reason unrelated to the tenant's obligations under the lease). Further, while

54. Predominately, these decisions occur in New York courts. See, e.g., Donnelly
v. Rosoff, 298 N.Y.S. 946,948 (Mun. Ct. 1937) ("a deposit so made by a tenant with his
landlord constitutes a trust fund, held by the landlord merely to secure the payment of

rent and the performance of the covenants of the lease"); see also Fore Improvement
Corp. v. Selig, 278 F.2d 143 (2d Cir. 1960); Mallory Assocs., Inc. v. Barving Realty Co.,
90 N.E.2d 468 (N.Y. 1949). The Friedman treatise suggests that these cases in fact
misapprehended applicable New York precedents. See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 32,
§ 20.4, at 1292 (cases deeming security to constitute a trust are "for the most part, New

York cases which were of doubtful validity" before New York's legislative landlordtenant reform). For further background, see Gilbert E. Harris, A Reveille to Lessees, 15
S. CAL. L. REV. 412, 421-24 (1942).

A significant number of states (including New York) have now enacted statutes that
explicitly obligate a landlord to hold security deposits in "trust" for its tenants' benefit.
See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-31 (1991); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:6 (1997);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (Supp. 2002); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (2001); S.C.
CODE § 27-40-210 (McKinney Supp. 2001). Numerous other states have enacted statutes
that create a similar relationship without specifically denominating the relationship as a
"trust." See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 47a-21 (West Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 25, § 5514(b) (Supp. 2000); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203 (Supp. 2001);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (West Supp. 2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-1607.1 (Supp. 1997).
55. Partington v. Miller, 5 A.2d 468, 471 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1939); Cummings v.

Freehold Trust Co., 191 A. 782, 783 (N.J. 1937); Boteler v. Koulouris, 37 P.2d 136, 137
(Cal. Ct. App. 1934); see also Harris, supra note 54, at 416-21.
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the landlord had no positive obligation to invest the deposit on the tenant's
behalf, any returnthat the landlorddid earn on the deposit was consideredthe
property ofthe tenant.56 Thus, while the pledgor could collect any interest that
its pledgee earned from investing the deposit, the pledgor could not collect
damages if the pledgee did not invest the deposit (i.e., interest that should have
been earned)."
Rather than characterize the deposit as a "trust" or a "pledge," the
overwhelming majority of courts resolving these landlord-tenant disputes
characterized the deposit as merely a "debt." Under this view, the landlord had
no duty to invest the deposit for the tenant, and the landlord could keep any
interest actually earned. Title to the deposited funds passed to the landlord as
soon as the tenant made the deposit. Under the "debt" characterization, the
tenant retained no interest in the money at all; instead, the tenant held merely a
contractual claim against the landlord for reimbursement to the extent that the
tenant fully performed its lease obligations.5" This characterization permitted the
landlord to commingle the deposit with other funds and to use the deposit
however it wished during the lease term, without liability to the tenant for this
conduct. In adopting this characterization, courts often relied upon the fact that
the typical lease placed no express contractual restraints upon the lessor's
conduct with respect to handling the deposit.59 By characterizing the deposit as
a "debt," then, courts vindicated the standard commercial practices of
landlords-in a fashion ostensibly consistent with the "presumed" intention of
both landlord and tenant.
In recent years, of course, many state legislatures have recognized that a
landlord's commingling and use of a tenant's security deposit for the landlord's
own account does violate the reasonable expectations of the typical residential
tenant. Further, state legislatures have also recognized that many residential
tenants lack the bargaining power needed to negotiate successfully for
meaningful constraints upon the landlord's handling of the deposit. As a result,
many state legislatures have displaced the common law rules with statutory
provisions requiring the landlord to hold a tenant's security deposit in trust for

56. Ingram v. Pantages, 260 P. 395, 396 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
57. Most commentators have concluded that Section 9-207, which sets forth the
rights and responsibilities of a secured party in possession of collateral, essentially
codified the normal incidents of the pledgor-pledgee relationship. See, e.g., 2 GRANT
GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS INPERSONAL PROPERTY § 42.1, at 1128 (1965) (Section
9-207 reflects "evident intent of codifying the common law [regarding pledgor-pledgee
relationship] without substantial change.").
58. For a summary of cases adopting this view, see Harris, supra note 54, at 41316.
59. See, e.g., Levinson v. Shapiro, 263 N.Y.S. 585, 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933)
("The nub of the matter is that if the parties had desired to restrict the landlord in the use
of the moneys, they would have so provided by appropriate language.").
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the tenant or to segregate it from other funds."0 Some of these statutes further
impose upon the landlord an affirmative obligation to pay interest on the deposit
(even if the landlord did not invest the deposit so as to earn interest).6 Absent
such statutes, however, courts in landlord-tenant cases have continued to
characterize the security deposit as a "debt" and have concluded that the
common law places no positive obligation on landlords to pay interest on tenant
security deposits.62
With this background in view, the court's error in Knightbecomes apparent.
As noted above, the court drew a negative inference from comparing Section 9207, Article 2A, and other Ohio statutes applicable to lessors:
When the General Assembly has intended to impose an obligation to
pay interest on security deposits, it has done so explicitly and not in an
oblique manner as the plaintiff contends was done in [Section 9-207].
Therefore, we conclude that it was not the legislative intent that lessors
of automobile leases be obligated to pay the lessee interest or profits
earned on the security deposits.63
The court assumed that if it had characterized Knight's deposit as a
"pledge"-i.e., if it had ruled that Section 9-207 governed the deposit-this
would have effectively reversed the common law principle that landlords had no
positive obligation to pay interest on security deposits (absent express
agreement). But in this assumption, the Knight court erroneously conflated
several entirely different questions. Whether a lessor's security deposit
constitutes an Article 9 security interest is an entirely separate question from
60. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §34.03.070(c) (Michie 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 3812-209(2)(b) (2000) (mobile home parks); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-21 (West Supp.
2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5514(b) (Supp. 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 83.49(1)
(West Supp. 2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 44-7-31 (Harrison 1991); IOWA CODE § 562A. 12(2)
(2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-25,108(b) (1994) (mobile home parks); MD. CODE ANN.
REAL PROP. § 8-203 (Supp. 2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 186, § 15B (West Supp.
2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:6 (1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (West Supp.
2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-10-10(B) (Michie 1995) (mobile home parks); N.Y. GEN.
OBLIG. LAW § 7-103(3) (McKinney 2001); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 233(4) (McKinney
Supp. 2002) (mobile home parks); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-50 (1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §
47-16-07.1 (Supp. 1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 115(A) (1999); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. §
250.51 lb (1994); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-301(a) (Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 59.18.270 (West 1990); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.20.170 (West Supp. 2002)
(mobile home parks).
61. For a comprehensive list of these statutory provisions, see infra note 67.
62. See, e.g., Korens v. R.W. Zukin Corp., 261 Cal. Rptr. 137, 139 (Cal. Ct. App.
1989) (refusing to create judicial rule "requiring the payment of interest on security
deposits when the legislature has declined to do so").
63. Knight v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 735 N.E.2d 513, 516 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
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whether the lessor is obligated to pay interest on that deposit or whether the
lessor may commingle that deposit. Characterizing the lessor's security deposit
as an Article 9 security interest (the effective equivalent of a common law
"pledge") would not have reversed the common law principle that a landlord had
no positive obligation to pay interest on a security deposit. A pledgee had no
such positive obligation under common law, and Section 9-207 merely codified
pre-Code law governing the pledgor-pledgee relationship.64 If a court held that
a lease security deposit created a pledge, such a holding thus would impose no
positive obligationon the lessor to avoid commingling the depositwith its other
funds.6 Section 9-207, under both the 1972 text and under Revised Article 9,
makes clear that a party holding a possessory security interest in money may
commingle that money with other funds without violating its duties to the
debtor."6 Further, a conclusion that the lessor held a security interest in a lease
security deposit would impose no affirmative obligation on the lessor to pay
interest on that deposit to the lessee. Consistent with common law principles
governing pledges, Section 9-207 does not obligate a party holding a possessory
security interest in money to invest those funds in an interest-bearing account in
cases where the secured party does not expressly agree to such an obligation. If
a lease does not affirmatively obligate the lessor to pay interest on a security
deposit, then Article 9 permits the lessor to invest the deposit in a non-interest
bearing account-or to keep it in a safe or a mattress, for that matter-and to
return it to the lessee at the end of the lease term without interest. By its express
terms, Article 9 would compel the lessor to pay interest on the deposit to the
lessee only (a) where the lease expressly provides for it, or (b) where the lessor
actually invests the depositso as to earn "money orfunds "from the deposited
amount (and even then only if the lease does not expressly disclaim any
obligation to remit these sums to the lessee).
Properly understood, the issue is not whether Section 9-207 positively
obligated lessors like Ford to invest the security deposits of lessees like Knight
in an interest-bearing account--clearly, Section 9-207 imposes no such
obligation, and thus the lessor has no such obligation unless another statute
expressly imposes it.67 Instead, the proper issue was whether Article 9 obligated

64. 2 GiLMOPE, supra note 57, § 42.1, at 1128 (Section 9-207 reflects "evident
intent of codifying the common law [regarding pledgor-pledgee relationship] without
substantial change.").
65. Such a positive duty might arise due to an express statutory obligation to
segregate security deposit funds-see the statutes listed supra note 60-but Section 9207 would not impose such a duty.
66. U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(d) (1972) ("Unless otherwise agreed, when collateral is in
the secured party's possession ... the secured party must keep the collateral identifiable,
but fungible collateral may be commingled."); U.C.C. § R9-207(b)(3) (2000) (same).
67. In the landlord-tenant context, a significant number of state legislatures have
imposed upon landlords a positive duty to pay interest upon security deposits. See, e.g.,
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Ford to remit to Knight any return Ford did earnfrom his deposit, given that
Ford's lease did not expressly reserve the right to retain such sums for its own

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1431 (B) (West Supp. 2002) (mobile home landlords) (5%);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-21(i) (West Supp. 2002) (average rate of insured savings
institutions or 1.5%, whichever is greater); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 715/1 (2001)

(passbook savings rate of state's largest commercial bank on deposits held longer than
six months); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 9098(2)(B) (West 1997) (mobile home
landlords) (4%); MD. CODEANN., REAL PROP. § 8-203(e) (Supp. 2002) (4%); MASS. GEN.

LAWS ANN. tit. 186, § 15B (Supp. 2002) (5%, or actual interest earned if less, on deposits
held one year or longer); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 504B. 178(2) (West 2002) (3%, increasing
to 4% after May 1, 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:6(IV)(a) (1997) (rate paid on
savings accounts at New Hampshire banks, on deposits held one year or longer); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 46:8-19 (West Supp. 2002) (all interest earned belongs to tenant, less
administrative fee; deposit must be placed in interest-bearing account); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.
LAW § 7-103 (McKinney 2001) (same); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-16-07.1 (Supp. 1997) (all
interest earned belongs to tenant where lease term is nine months or longer; deposit must
be placed in interest-bearing account); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.16(A) (Anderson
1989) (5% on deposits exceeding $50 or one month's periodic rent, where tenant remains
in possession for six months or longer); 68 PA. CONS. STAT. § 250.511(b) (1994)
(landlord must pay interest on deposits held for more than two years); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 55-248.15: 1(B) (Michie Supp. 2002) (1% below discount rate, on deposits held greater
than 13 months). By contrast, Florida does not obligate landlords to place deposits in
interest-bearing accounts, but obligates those who do so to pay to tenants either 5%
interest on deposits or 75% of the interest actually earned by deposits. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 83.49(l) (West Supp. 2002).
In a few states, legislatures have enacted general statutory landlord-tenant reforms,
but those statutes expressly relieve the landlord of any obligation to pay interest on
security deposits (absent a contrary lease agreement). See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 3812-209(2)(b) (2000) (mobile home landlords) (interest earned on deposit deemed
property of landlord); IOWA CODE § 562A. 12(2) (200 1) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5825,108(b) (1994) (mobile home landlords) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-10-10(B)
(Michie 1995) (mobile home landlords) (same); OKLA. STAT. tit. 41, § 115(B) (1999)
(landlord may return deposit "without interest"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.18.270
(West 1990) (landlord need not pay interest earned on security deposits absent contrary
written agreement); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 59.20.170 (Supp. 2002) (mobile home
landlords) (same).
In a number of states, legislation obligates landlords to place deposit funds in a
bank account containing only security deposits-and to hold those funds "in trust" or "for
the benefit of" the tenant-but without expressly addressing the allocation of interest
earned. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.03.070(c) (Michie 1998); CAL. CIV. CODE §
1950.5(d) (West Supp. 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 25, § 5514(b) (Supp. 2000); GA.
CODE ANN. § 44-7-31 (1991); HAW. REV. STAT. § 521-44(b) (1993); OR. REV. STAT. §

90.300(2) (2001); S.C. CODE § 27-40-210 (Law Co-op. Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 66-28-301(a) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1997). Presumably, under the existing common law
rules, these statutes would obligate landlords to payinterest on security deposits if courts
in those states interpreted the statutes to establish an actual trust relationship between
landlord and tenant with respect to the deposit.
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account. Courts can and should resolve this issue without having to express an
opinion about the merits of the traditional common law rule that landlords have
no positive duty to invest tenant security deposits."s
2. The Pledge/Debt Distinction and Article 9's Scope Provisions
The second problem with the security deposit cases is that they disregard
Article 9's scope provisions. Following the adoption of Article 9, the common
law's pledge/debt dichotomy as articulated in pre-Code landlord-tenant cases
becomes irrelevant. Even if a security deposit creates a debt owing from the
lessor to the lessee, that conclusion does not establish that the security deposit
cannot also constitute an Article 9 security interest. If the lessor holds the
deposit as security for the lessee's obligations under the lease, then the deposit
creates both a "debt" and an Article 9 "security interest."
As a few courts appear to have conceded,6 9 one cannot reconcile decisions
like Knight and Yeager with the breadth of Article 9's scope provisions. While
the 1972 text of Section 9-102(1)(a) stated that Article 9 governs "any
transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security
interest," this does not mean that the 1972 text required that the parties had to
have contracted with specific reference to Article 9 or had to have stated "we
intend to create a security interest."7 Quite the opposite is true, as the world of

68. As explored infra notes 78-81 and accompanying text, it is by no means clear
that the traditional common law rule states an appropriate "gap-filler" regarding the
landlord's obligation to pay interest in cases where the lease is silent.
69. See, e.g., Doe v. GMAC, 635 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Wis. 2001) ("Were we writing on
a clean slate, we might be receptive to [the] argument that the security deposit provision
in her lease agreement with GMAC was 'intended to create a security interest' as
provided [in Article 9].").
70. In its decision, the Yeager court looked to White and Summers' Uniform
Commercial Code treatise for guidance on the appropriate legal standard for whether a
contract created a security interest. Yeager v. GMAC, 719 So. 2d 210, 213 (Ala. 1998).
Unfortunately, the court looked to a dated edition of the treatise, which expressed the
standard as follows:
The court must first resolve, as a question of law, whether the language
embodied in the writing objectively indicates that the parties may have
intended to create or provide for a security agreement. If the language crosses
this objective threshold, that is, if the writing evidences a possible secured
transaction and thus satisfies the statute of frauds requirement, then the
factfinder must inquire whether the parties actually intended to create a
security interest.
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

§ 23.3, at 905 n.5

(2d ed. 1980) (emphasis added). As explained in the text, however, this articulation
confuses the nature of the inquiry. (Subsequent editions of the treatise do not contain the
quoted passage.) What is important is whether the parties intended to enter into a
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Article 9 is (or is supposed to be) a world of substance over form. Article 9
governs if the parties intended to enter into an agreement in which rights in
property secure payment or performance of an obligation; whether the parties
intend that such an agreement should be governed by Article 9 is irrelevant.7
As Bill Henning, Bill Lawrence and I have explained elsewhere, "[w]ith parties
sometimes disposed to disguise the true nature of their transactions, courts
cannot accept their expressions of intention as controlling and simply pursue [the
parties'] underlying subjective intentions to ascertain the appropriate legal
characterization of any given transaction."" The appropriate inquiry is whether
the parties entered into a transaction in which they used property to secure
payment or performance of an obligation-if so, then Article 9 applies regardless
of the parties' subjective intentions, unless Article 9 expressly excludes that
transaction from its scope.
Both the text of Article 9 and its comments plainly contemplate that parties
can create a security interest in money.73 This dictates a conclusion that if one
party requires another party to deposit money in order to secure the depositor's
payment or performance obligations to the depositee, then a security interest in

contractual relationship in which rights in property serve to secure payment or
performance of an obligation-not whether the parties intended that this agreement
would constitute a "security agreement." WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, WILLIAM H. HENNING
& R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, UNDERSTANDING SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 2.02[A], at 76-

78 (2d ed. 1999).
Revised Article 9 avoids the potential confusion created by the word "intended" by
defining its basic scope in terms of "a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a
security interest in personal property." U.C.C. § R9-109(a)(1) (2000). The comments
make clear that this understanding should have been implicit under the 1972 text of
Section 9-102 cmt. 2, and this understanding is consistent with Professor Gilmore's
observation that "intended" in this context "has nothing to do with the subjective
intention of the parties, or either of them." I GILMORE, supra note 57, at § 11.2, at 338.
71. U.C.C. § R9-109, cmt. 2 ("When a security interest is created, this Article
applies regardless of the form of the transaction or the name that parties have given to
it.").
72. LAWRENCE ET AL., supra note 70, § 1.03[A], at 12. Section 1-201(37)'s
definition of"security interest" makes this explicit in authorizing courts to re-characterize
as a "security interest," in appropriate cases, a transaction that the parties themselves
labeled as a "lease." U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (1999).
73. U.C.C. § R9-313(a) (2000) ("a secured party may perfect a security interest in
...money.., by taking possession of the collateral"); id. § R9-332(a) ("A transferee of
money takes the money free of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion
with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured party."); id. § R9-313 cmt. 2
("[Section R9-313] permits a security interest to be perfected by the taking of possession
only when the collateral is goods, instruments, negotiable documents, money, or tangible
chattel paper"); id. § R9-3 10 cmt. 2 (filing ordinarily [does not] perfect a security interest
in ...money"); id.
§ R9-315 cmt. 2 ("Section 9-332 enables .. most transferees of
money to take free of a perfected security interest in the ...money.").
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money arises-unless Article 9's scope provisions explicitly exclude that
transaction. Notably, Article 9's scope provisions contain no express exclusion
for security deposits.7" Furthermore, a "security deposit" serves the exact same
economic function as a possessory security interest in money. Thus, if the cases
excluding lease security deposits from the scope of Article 9 are correct, then any
parties using money to secure payment or performance of an obligation can opt
out of Article 9 altogether merely by calling the transfer a "security deposit." As
a result, excluding security deposits from the scope of Article 9 would render
superfluous those provisions that contemplate the existence of possessory
security interests in money.
Further, Section 303 of the new Uniform Consumer Leases Act ("UCLA"),
which governs security deposits in consumer leases, strongly reinforces the
conclusion that a security deposit is an Article 9 security interest. Section 303(a)
provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subsection (b), a consumer lease
... may not provide for the creation of a security interest in personal or real
property of the lessee to secure the payment of obligations arising from the
lease."7 Section 303(b) then provides that a consumer lease "may provide for
...
a security deposit."76 By treating security deposits as a subset of the broader
term "security interest"-and allowing them as an exception to its general
prohibition against the lessor's taking of security-the UCLA implicitly
recognizes that a security deposit in a consumer lease is an Article 9 security
interest in money.77

In sum, to justify the rationale of the security deposit cases, one would have
to indulge the assumption that the drafters intended that a possessory security
interest in money would arise only in transactions where the parties were too
stupid or uninformed to use the term "security deposit" to describe their
agreement. Given Article 9's generally expansive scope provisions and its
warning that courts should interpret them by reference to economic substance
rather than legal form, courts are simply wrong to conclude that Article 9
excludes security deposits. With respect to its scope, Article 9 is not a baseline
rule from which parties are free to opt out by contract, and courts most certainly
should not interpret Article 9's scope provisions to make it so.

74. U.C.C. § 9-104 (1972); U.C.C. § R9-109(d) (2000).
75. U.C.L.A. § 303(a) (2002). The UCLA defines the term "security interest" to
have the identical meaning as the same term under the UCC. Id. § 102(b)(9).

76. Id. § 303(b)(1).
77.

Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) Section 3.301(2) provides a

comparable provision and thus gives rise to a comparable inference.

Likewise,

substantially comparable provisions already exist in a number of states that have adopted

provisions based upon the UCCC. See, e.g., 815

ILL. COMP. STAT.

§ 636/30 (1999);

IOWA CODE § 537.3301(2) (2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-2-407(2) (Law. Co-op. 2002);

WIS.

STAT.

ANN. § 422.417(2) (West Supp. 2001);

WYO. STAT.

ANN. § 40-14-241(b)

(Michie 2001).
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3. Is "No Interest on Security Deposits" an Appropriate Baseline Rule?
The reasoning of the security deposit cases has also had one potentially
unfortunate side-effect: courts in the security deposit cases have simply taken
for granted that the traditional common law rule (i.e., no interest on a security
deposit where the lease is silent) provides an appropriate baseline rule. But it is
not entirely clear that the traditional common law rule states an appropriate "gapfiller." Presumably, the argument in support of the traditional rule is that in any
particular lease, the lessor's costs of investment, recordkeeping, and
reimbursement might exceed the interest actually earned on the deposit.
Certainly, no lessor would voluntarily agree to reimburse its lessee $6 in earned
interest if the lessor would incur more than $6 in administrative costs-at least
not without the lessee's agreement to pay an additional amount in rent to
compensate the lessor for this administrative expense. Moreover, if the
administrative expense exceeded the expected interest, the lessee would
presumably forgo any claim to interest earned rather than bear the higher rent
that the lessor would demand to pay such a duty. Thus, in looking at any isolated
lessor-lessee bargain, it seems reasonable to predict that reasonable parties would
agree that the lessor should have no obligation to pay interest on the lessee's
security deposit. Under this analysis, a "no interest on security deposits" rule
appears to make sense as a gap-filler. 8
There are two problems with this argument, however. First, while the
argument is sensible in the context of an individual lessor-lessee negotiation, it
may break down in the context of multiple transactions. For the first lessee, the
lessor's administrative costs may well exceed the interest payable to that lessee.
But as a commercial lessor deals with increasing numbers of lessees, economies
of scale reduce the lessor's administrative costs on a per-lessee basis. The
lessor's total costs may in fact be less-perhaps quite a bit less-than the total
interest that the lessor could accrue on all aggregated security deposits. In this
context, if individual lessees could organize and bargain collectively, a
reasonable lessor might be compelled to agree to pay interest on security deposits
(or capitulate to organized lessee demands for rent concessions to offset the
forgone interest). That assumes, however, that no structural barriers to such a
voluntary agreement exist. In reality, lessees negotiate leases individually, not
collectively, and no individual lessee has a sufficient financial incentive to
negotiate for and obtain the lessor's general commitment to pay interest on all
lessee security deposits. As a result, lessees can only bargain collectively in an
indirect fashion-through legislatures-where the structural barrier to collective
bargaining is more easily overcome. By enacting legislation obligating lessors
to pay interest on security deposits, the legislature may be seen as bargaining on

78. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 91-93 (4th
ed. 1992) (discussing use of economic analysis in filling contractual gaps).

HeinOnline -- 68 Mo. L. Rev. 90 2003

2003]

ARE SECURITY DEPOSITS "SECURITY INTERESTS"?

91

behalf of diffuse lessees, accomplishing the bargain that unimpeded collective
bargaining presumptively would have produced.79

The second problem is that the traditional argument assumes equality of
bargaining power between lessors and lessees-an assumption many would
reject as false, at least in the contexts of residential leases of land and consumer
leases. Certainly, the lessor benefits from the use of the lessee's money during
the lease term, even if that benefit is less than the administrative cost of
accounting for it. Thus, under the traditional argument, one might expect that
market forces would compel the lessor to accept a slight rent concession in order
to avoid the administrative costs of accounting for interest on lessee security
deposits. But to the extent that residential lessors have systematically greater
bargaining power than lessees, lessors may instead refuse to make any rental
concession and pocket this benefit for themselves-thus explaining why many
legislatures have chosen to make deposit protection regulations nonwaivable."
With these insights, one might take two distinct views of state legislation
requiring lessors to pay interest on tenant security deposits. One might view
such legislation as a policy-driven rejection of contrary common law principles,
driven by real or perceived bargaining power inequalities and implemented in
order to constrain rent-seeking behavior by lessors. Under this view, a court in
a state without such a statute would presumably continue to conclude that lessors
should have no positive duty to pay interest on lessees' security deposits.
Alternatively, one might treat such statutes as a recognition of the hypothetical
lessor-lessee bargain absent structural barriers to collective negotiation. Under
this latter view, courts in states without a statute might well conclude that
evolving common law principles should place a positive duty upon landlords to
pay interest on security deposits, absent an express contrary agreement between
the parties. Unfortunately, by uncritically accepting the common law no-intereston-security-deposits rule, the security deposit cases have not explored these
alternative views at all-which is somewhat surprising, given the significant
influence that economic analysis of law has had in transforming the landlordtenant relationship generally."'

79. See, e.g., 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 715/1 (2001) (landlord with 25 or more units
obligated to pay interest on deposits held more than six months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:819 (West Supp. 2002) (landlord with ten or more units obligated to pay interest on
deposits); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 7-103 (McKinney 2001) (landlord with six or more
units obligated to pay interest on deposits).
80. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 47a-4(a)(4) (Supp. 2002) (lease cannot
disclaim landlord's obligation to pay interest on deposit); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP.
§ 8-203(i) (Supp. 2001) (same); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 540-A:8(III) (1997) (same).
81. For example, in recent years, courts have shown a willingness to use contract
law principles, where appropriate, to imply into leases obligations going beyond those
traditionally imposed by landlord-tenant law. See, e.g., Pugh v. Holmes, 405 A.2d 897
(Pa. 1979) (adopting implied warranty of habitability); Schneiker v. Gordon, 732 P.2d
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C. Rethinking the Auto Lease Security Deposit Dilemma
Like many Article 9 teachers, I sometimes struggle to help intimidated
students see and appreciate Article 9's general coherence. As a result, the most
exasperating thing about the security deposit cases is that there was no needfor
the courts to have reached the sweeping conclusion that Article 9 excluded
security deposits. In each case, the court could have decided the case on the
merits, in favor of the lessor, without concluding that a security deposit was not
an Article 9 security interest.
To see why, consider the facts of the typical automobile lease transaction
which has given rise to most of the disputes. Lessee Jane enters an auto lease.
Jane pays Dealer a $250 security deposit pursuant to the lease, which is silent
regarding Lessor's obligation to invest (or pay interest upon) the deposit. Dealer
then assigns the lease to Manufacturer Credit Company ("MCC"), the financing
arm of the auto manufacturer. Rather than negotiating the deposit check to
MCC, Dealer simply agrees that MCC will deduct $250 (the deposit amount)
from the sum it has agreed to pay Dealer to purchase the lease. Thus, MCC
never physically receives Jane's money; instead, it merely maintains on its books
an account payable to Jane at the conclusion of the lease term. Dealer, having
assigned the lease to MCC (and the expected liability for return of the deposit),
then places the deposit check in its own operating account, and shortly thereafter
spends it on the typical expenses associated with running an automobile
dealership. When the lease term expires, MCC satisfies the account payable by
issuing a check for the deposit amount (without interest) to Jane.
In this hypothetical, nothing in Section 9-207 would justify judgment for
Jane if Jane sued to collect interest on her security deposit. Section 9-207 does
not impose upon the secured party any affirmative obligation to invest money
held as collateral on the debtor's account. Because neither Dealer nor MCC
invested Jane's deposit in an interest-bearing account, 2 neither received "money

603 (Colo. 1987) (obligating landlord to mitigate loss caused by tenant's abandonment
of premises). See generally Charles J. Goetz, Wherefore the Landlord-Tenant Law
"Revolution "?-Some Comments, 69 CORNELL L. REv. 592 (1984).
82. MCC might also argue that because it did not actually receive Jane's deposit
check (but merely credited the amount of the deposit against the purchase price of the
lease), it never took possession of the deposit within the meaning of Article 9. If this

were true, of course, MCC would not have the duties imposed upon a secured party
holding a possessory security interest under Section 9-207. At least one court has relied
upon this argument in rendering judgment for the lessor. See Knight v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 735 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000) ("We are not persuaded that
listing a security deposit as an increase to a security deposit payable account is the same
as a 'sum in [Ford Credit's] possession.' . . . An account payable entry on a balance
sheet by no means implies physical possession of the account to be paid.").
This argument is too cute by at least half. By virtue of deducting the deposit from
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or funds" from the deposit within the meaning of Section 9-207.13 Thus, because the lease did not obligate Lessor to pay interest upon the deposit, neither
Dealer nor MCC would have liability to Jane for interest upon that sum under
Article 9.84
In an attempt to avoid this result, Jane might argue that MCC did in fact
benefit from the deposit, because it reduced MCC's cost of acquiring the lease
by $250 and thereby enabled MCC to obtain indirect but potentially quantifiable
financial benefits. For example, assume that each month, MCC purchased
noninterest-bearing certificates of deposit from the banks who handle MCC's
financial services, in an amount equal to the total amount of security deposits
under leases purchased during that month. Even ifMCC did not earn interest on
these certificates, MCC might still benefit economically in significant ways.
These available funds might reduce MCC's need to borrow (thereby saving
interest costs on money not borrowed) or enable MCC to earn a return by
investing its excess funds in otherwise productive investments (such as
purchasing more automobile leases)., 5 Alternatively, MCC's banks might
provide MCC with "earnings credits" on these deposits which might offset
banking fees for which MCC would otherwise be liable. 6 But if Jane argues that
these indirect benefits constitute "money or funds received from" the deposit
within the meaning of Article 9, courts properly should reject this argument.
First, under such an argument, Section 9-207 would no longer serve merely to
codify pre-Code common law principles regarding pledges.8 7 By imposing

the lease purchase price, MCC unquestionably has dominion over a sum of money equal
to the amount of the original deposit. Because money is fungible, it should be irrelevant
that this sum is not the exact same $250 that Jane originally paid. Properly understood,
MCC clearly has possession of a sum equivalent to the amount of the security deposit.
Of course, as explained in the text, MCC's mere possession of the $250 does not impose
upon MCC any obligation to invest that sum for Jane's benefit.
83. Martin v. Gold Key Lease, Inc., 988 F. Supp. 1101, 1104-05 (N.D. IIl. 1997);
Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., 953 F. Supp. 974,984-87 (N.D. I11.
1997);
Knight, 735 N.E.2d at 518-20.
84. This reasoning could have sustained ajudgment in favor of the lessor in Dolan
v. GMAC, 739 N.E.2d 848 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000), but the Dolan court never addressed
or even acknowledged such a possibility. In Doe v. GMA C, 635 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001), the court acknowledged this possibility, but refused to address it based upon the
court's broader conclusion that Article 9 excluded lease security deposits. Doe, 635
N.W.2d at 12. By contrast, in Knight, the court relied upon this argument as an
alternative basis for its decision. Knight, 735 N.E.2d at 518-20.
85. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully made such an argument in the Demitropoulosand
Knight cases. Demitropoulos, 953 F. Supp. at 984-85; Knight, 735 N.E.2d at 5 18-19.
86. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully raised such an argument in In re Ford Motor
Credit Co. Motor Vehicle Lease Litig., No. 95 CIV. 1876, 1998 WL 159051, at **1.-3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1988).
87. See supra note 64.
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liability for indirect benefits associated with mere possession of the money, it
would effectively force the secured party to invest the collateral in order to offset
this liability-thereby unquestionably triggering the applicability of Section 9207.8 Second, such an argument creates severe practical tracing problems. In
the MCC hypothetical, it is unclear whether or how a court could accurately
quantify the financial benefits to MCC associated with a combination of reduced
borrowing costs and earning credits.89 Moreover, given that MCC's borrowing
needs would undoubtedly fluctuate over time, it is unclear how MCC could
accurately allocate the benefit associated with reduced borrowing costs to
lessee's particular lease (as distinguished from other leases acquired at different
times).
Thus, to the extent that MCC's practices for handling security deposits are
similar to those prevailing within the industry, MCC would not incur liability to

88. See, e.g., Demitropoulos,953 F. Supp. at 985 ("If [this interpretation of Section
9-207 were] adopted, courts would have license to hold lessors who place security
deposits in non-interest-bearing bank accounts liable to lessees for any hypothetical
benefits the account might generate, such as an enhanced credit line from the bank.").
89. Id. ("This Court will not, without legislative direction, place on lessors such an
onerous burden to discern and calculate every possible benefit, no matter how small or
tangential, gained from holding onto a security deposit. The UCC was enacted to
'simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial transactions,' not
complicate and muddle it.") (quoting U.C.C. § 9-102(2)(a) (1972)).
In other contexts, Article 9's drafters have scrupulously avoided creating rights or
responsibilities that would produce similar practical tracing burdens. For example,
consider Article 9's treatment of the secured party's interest in proceeds of its collateral.
Article 9 defines proceeds to include "whatever is acquired upon the sale, lease, license,
exchange, or other disposition of collateral," U.C.C. § R9-102(a)(64)(A) (2000), as well
as "whatever is collected on, or distributed on account of, collateral," U.C.C. § R9102(a)(64)(B) (2000). Such a broad definition might well create significant tracing
problems. For example, suppose that Bank finances Contractor's purchase of a bulldozer
and takes a security interest in the bulldozer. Contractor then uses the bulldozer on a
series of jobs that produce accounts receivable. Under the Code's broad definition of
"proceeds," one might argue that the accounts constitute proceeds of the bulldozer. See,
e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretationand
Revision ofSection 9-306,69 TULANE L. REV. 645,699-707 (1995) (noting that accounts
generated through use of depreciating collateral such as equipment are functionally
comparable to sums generated through the lease of depreciating collateral, and arguing
that each are properly understood as "proceeds" of the collateral). Of course, the
accounts are not attributable solely to the bulldozer, but also to Contractor's labor,
experience, and expertise (and perhaps to other consumable inputs)-and these latter
items are not subject to Bank's security interest. Recognizing that the resolution of such
tracing problems would be practically impossible, Article 9's drafters made clear that the
secured party's interest continued only as to "identifiable" proceeds. U.C.C. § 9-306(2)
(1972); U.C.C. § R9-315(a)(2) (2000). This limitation effectively moots any argument
that Bank gets proceeds coverage over Contractor's accounts,
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pay interest on lease security deposits. Absent either a contrary agreement in the
lease itself or contrary positive law (i.e., a statute other than Article 9), Article
9 would create such liability only in the rare case where MCC actually invested
the deposit in an interest-bearing account. Furthermore, MCC can easily avoid
such liability by ensuring that the lease expressly allocates any interest or return
earned on the deposit to the lessor/assignee. As Section 9-207 establishes merely
a baseline rule, such an express contractual provision would be enforceable
(unless law other than Article 9 affirmatively and immutably obligated the lessor
to pay interest).
Likewise, to the extent that MCC's practices for handling security deposits
are similar to those prevailing within the industry, MCC would not incur liability
on account of its commingling and handling of security deposit funds. Section
9-207 makes clear that the secured party may commingle fungible collateral
(such as money) as long as the secured party keeps the collateral identifiable.9"
Thus, Article 9 would not force MCC to segregate the security deposits from
other company funds. Further, as long as MCC eventually refunded security
deposits to its lessees, Section 9-207's identifiability requirement would not pose
any meaningful liability risk to MCC. At first blush, the obligation to keep the
collateral identifiable would appear to prevent MCC from disposing of security
deposit funds for its own purposes, at least if at the time of disposition MCC
lacked other unencumbered funds in an amount sufficient to satisfy its security
deposit obligations. But even if such use of the funds violates Section 9-207,
MCC would face no liability for this violation as long as it eventually refunded
the deposit in a timely fashion-because MCC's lessees would suffer no actual
loss on account of MCC's behavior, and none of Article 9's consumer penalties
would apply in this instance.9

90. U.C.C. § 9-207(2)(d) (1972); U.C.C. § R9-207(b)(3) (2000).
91. Ordinarily, the secured party is liable only for actual damages caused as a result
of its failure to comply with its Article 9 obligations. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1972); U.C.C.
§ R9-625(b) (2000). Article 9 does provide for minimum damages, regardless of loss,
if the collateral is consumer goods. U.C.C. § 9-507(1) (1972); U.C.C. § R9-625(c)
(2000) ("an amount not less than the credit service charge plus 10 percent of the principal
amount of the obligation or the time-price differential plus 10 percent of the cash price").
This "consumer penalty" would not apply in the security deposit cases, however, because
the collateral would be "money" and Article 9 expressly dictates that "consumer goods"
does not include money. U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(h) (1972); U.C.C. § R9-102(a)(44) (2000)
("goods" does not include money). Further, while Revised Article 9 does provide for
statutory damages (regardless of actual loss) in the event of secured party noncompliance
with certain provisions, see U.C.C. § R9-625(e),(f) (2000), these provisions do not
include Section 9-207. Thus, absent contrary lease provisions, MCC would face liability
for its conduct in handling security deposits only in cases where MCC actually failed to
refund the security deposit in a timely fashion.
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Thus, even if courts properly treated security deposits as Article 9 security
interests, most existing lease transactions should not render lessors and/or
assignees liable for interest on security deposits. Further, lessors and their
assignees could quickly adjust to avoid even the minimal risk of liability in future
transactions. As a result, there is no functional reason for courts to interpret
Article 9 so as to exclude lease security deposits from its scope." In his work
on the interpretive challenges presented by drafting errors within Article 9,93
Professor Gregory Maggs articulated five general guidelines for courts in
interpreting Article 9's provisions: (1) courts should generally interpret the Code
in accordance with its purposes, as dictated by Section 1-102(1); 9' (2) courts
should establish a presumption of codification, not revision;95 (3) courts should
recognize that the Code establishes mostly baseline rules;96 (4) courts should
appreciate the need for uniformity; 97 and (5) courts should adopt inclusive
approaches to scope questions.9 Consideration of these guidelines confirms the
lack of any functional justification for courts to interpret Article 9 as excluding
security deposits.
In the context of the security deposit cases, guidelines (1) and (5) most
clearly suggest treating lease security deposits as Article 9 security interests.
There can be no doubt that Article 9's primary purpose was to consolidate the
m6lange of pre-Code security devices within the unitary conception of the

92. Treating the security deposit as a security interest in money would have no
practical consequences for the lessor's enforcement of its rights. While Article 9 requires
the secured party to dispose of collateral after default in a "commercially reasonable"
fashion, U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1972); U.C.C. § R9-6 10(b) (2000), the secured party would
"dispose" of money collateral simply by applying it to the debt. Accordingly, the
"reasonableness" of any such disposition would focus solely upon the lessor's
mathematical calculation of the debt. Further, the lessor would not have to provide
notification to the lessee or other parties prior to enforcement (unless the lease agreement
provided to the contrary), as money is customarily exchanged in a recognized market and
Article 9 excuses notice in such circumstances. U.C.C. § 9-504(3) (1972); U.C.C. § R9611 (d) (2000).
93. Gregory E. Maggs, Patterns of DraftingErrorsin the Uniform Commercial
Code and How Courts Should Respond to Them, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 81.
94. Id. at 117 (Section l- 102(1) directs that the Code "shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.").
95. Id. at 118 ("Unless something indicates otherwise, courts should presume the
drafters intended only to preserve the previous rule.").
96. See infra text accompanying note 104.
97. Maggs, supra note 93, at 119 ("Although courts do not have to follow UCC
precedents from other jurisdictions, they often should do that. Nonuniformity among
jurisdictions may hinder the planning of interstate commercial transactions and increase
the cost of resolving disputes.").
98. Maggs, supra note 93, at 119.
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"security interest."99 Furthermore, the Code establishes a clear directive that
courts should resolve scope-related issues by reference to economic substance
rather than legal form or location of title.'00 This is most clearly demonstrated
in Section 1-201(37), which prevents parties from entering into a security
transaction and avoiding the consequences of Article 9 merely by characterizing
their agreement as a "lease" governed by the common law of leasing."'
Likewise, courts should not permit the parties to "opt out" of Article 9's scope
altogether merely by characterizing a security device as a "deposit."
Properly understood, guideline (2)--the presumption of codification-does
not justify excluding lease security deposits from Article 9 security interests.
Courts in the security deposit cases (as in Knight) have concluded that because
pre-Code common law clearly established that lessors had no duty to pay interest
on security deposits, the drafters should be assumed to have effectively codified
that rule. But as explained above,'0 2 such a conclusion is a non sequitur. Section
9-207 does not establish a baseline rule positively obligating the secured party
to pay interest on money collateral held in its possession. Section 9-207 instead
codifies pre-Code rules governing pledges, under which the pledgee had no duty
to invest the collateral on the pledgor's behalf, but did have to account for the
earnings if it did invest the collateral. In the security deposit cases, courts have
misinterpreted the fact that Section 9-207 does not impose a positive obligation
to pay interest. The courts have not treated this as a mere codification of preCode pledge law, but as evidence that Article 9's scope provision implicitly
accepted landlord-tenantlaw's distinction between a "pledge" and a "debt."

This is simply bizarre; Section 9-207 is not a scope provision, and there is no
evidence that the drafters viewed it as being relevant to the resolution of scope
issues. As to Article 9's scope, it is Section 1-201(37) that is critical, and the
language of that Section thoroughly belies any conclusion that Article 9's
drafters blindly accepted formal distinctions grounded in landlord-tenant law.0 3
Likewise, guideline (3)--that the Code establishes principally baseline
rules--does not justify excluding lease security deposits from Article 9's scope.
As Professor Maggs has explained this guideline:

99. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. (1972); § R9-101 cmt. 1 (2000); 1 GILMORE,
supranote 57, § 9.1, at 288-90 (1965).
100. U.C.C. § 9-202 cmt. (1972); § R9-202 cmt. 2 (2000) (location of title
irrelevant with respect to rights and responsibilities of parties to a secured transaction).
101. See U.C.C. § 1-201 cmt. 37 (1999) (scope of "security interest" to be
informed by "economics" rather than parties' subjective intent as manifested by formal
labels).
102. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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The ability of parties to contract around most of the rules in the UCC
should give courts some comfort when confronting gaps, conflicts, and
ambiguities in the UCC. No matter what choices they make, their
decisions may have only a limited effect on future cases. If parties in
the future want a different rule, they generally can establish one in
their contracts. With this idea in mind, courts often should have two
goals when selecting the meaning of a UCC provision that they
otherwise cannot interpret. First, courts should select the rule that
most parties in the future will favor to save them the effort of having
to contract around it. Second, courts should make clear what choice
they have made so that parties in the future may revise the rule by
agreement if they choose.'0 4
One might argue, as the court appears to have done in Knight, that excluding
security deposits from Article 9 is appropriate because historical practice proves
that lessors will not agree to pay interest on security deposits unless forced to do
so by legislation. °5 Thus, excluding security deposits from Article 9 would save
the parties from having to express this understanding explicitly or having to
bargain around a contrary result. By the same token, however, it hardly seems
burdensome to obligate lessors-who overwhelmingly tend to be the masters of
their own documents-to make such an understanding implicit in their forms.
This seems particularly appropriate to the extent that historical landlord practice
(particularly in the residential context) reflects more about bargaining power
inequalities than the underlying shared understandings of the parties. 6
Moreover, excluding lease security deposits from Article 9 in order to validate
this historical practice presents a more compelling problem-Article 9's scope
provision is not a baselinerule. The lease security deposit cases allow the lessor
to escape the impact of Article 9 merely by denominating the payment as a
"deposit," but nothing in Article 9 appears to sanction such a practice.
Only guideline (4)-facilitation of uniformity-could plausibly justify a
court's adherence to the view that Article 9 excludes lease security deposits from
its coverage. As Professor Maggs argues, interjurisdictional nonuniformity
might so increase the cost of planning transactions and resolving disputes as to
justify a state court in following what it believes to be another state court's
earlier yet erroneous interpretation of the Code. 7 In its decision in Doe, the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals appears to have rested its conclusion on this very
ground-relying upon the conclusions of earlier decisions in other states despite
overt doubt about whether that result could be squared with the language of

104. Maggs, supra note 93, at 118.
105. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

106. See supra text accompanying note 80.
107. Maggs, supra note 93, at 119.
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Article 9. "' Nevertheless, there is a countervailing argument: interjurisdictional
nonuniformity may both crystallize disputed issues for further debate (and better,
more informed decisionmaking) and provide useful empirical data about the
economic impact of different decision rules." 9 Further, because of the unique
role of the UCC and its Permanent Editorial Board ("PEB")-which can issue
targeted interpretive commentary when interpretive questions or problems
arise -interjurisdictional
nonuniformity does not necessarily require the
extensive costs of statutory amendment and fifty-state recodification. As has
happened on other occasions, the PEB may issue commentary on the appropriate
resolution of scope issues,"'1 and courts have generally accorded PEB
Commentaries significant weight as authoritative interpretive guides." 2 Thus,

108. Doe v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 635 N.W.2d 7, 10 (Wis. Ct. App.
2001) ("Were we writing on a clean slate, we might be receptive to Doe's argument that
the security deposit provision in her lease agreement with GMAC was 'intended to create
a security interest' as provided in [Section 9-102(1)(a)]. The issue of UCC Article Nine's
applicability to this transaction is far from one of first impression, however. Although
no Wisconsin appellate court has considered the issue, courts in several other
jurisdictions which have enacted the UCC have done so. We may properly look to these
rulings from otherjurisdictions to guide our analysis of [Wisconsin's version of Section
9-207], so as to further the goal of uniformity of interpretation of the provisions of the
UCC.").
109. This is to some extent analogous with the view that circuit splits within the
federal courts are desirable because they produce "percolation" of issues and thus
produce better eventual decisions in the long run. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The
NationalCourtofAppeals: An Unwise Proposal,83 YALE L.J. 883, 898 (1974) (arguing
that many conflicts "perhaps ought to be endured while judges and scholars observe the
respective workings out in practice of the conflicting rules"); see also Michael
Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1638-40 (2000) (discussing
impact of alternative proposals for en banc review of appellate decisions in light of
ostensible percolation and experimentation benefits associated with interjurisdictional
nonuniformity).
110. The PEB issues commentary from time to time for one or more of the
following purposes: (1) to resolve an ambiguity by articulating the PEB's view of the
correct legal rule; (2) to express the PEB's preferred view on an issue where court
opinions or scholarly commentary disagree; (3) to elaborate on the Code's application
where the statutory language or comments leave doubt as to the Code's scope; (4) to
apply Code principles to new or changed circumstances; (5) to clarify the relationship
between the Code, other statutes, and general principles of law and equity; or (6) to
otherwise improve the operation of the Code. See PREFACE TO PEB COMMENTARY, PEB
RESOLUTION ON PURPOSES, STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES FOR PEB COMMENTARY TO
THE UCC (March 14, 1987).
111. See PEB Commentary No. 12 (Section 9-302) (February 10, 1994); PEB
Commentary No. 14 (Section 9-102(1)(b)) (June 10, 1994).
112. In re Kelaidis, 276 B.R. 266, 270 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2002); Phillips v. Ball and
Hunt Enters., Inc., 933 F. Supp. 1290, 1295 n.12 (W.D. Va. 1996); In re Solfanelli, 206
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even the functional goal of promoting uniformity does not clearly justify
decisions exempting lease security deposits from Article 9's scope.
II. WHO CARES? WHY THE SECURITY DEPOSIT CASES MATTER
At this point, it is fair to ask whether Part I is much ado about nothing.
Section 9-207 expresses a baseline rule around which parties are free to bargain.
Thus, even if courts interpreted Article 9 correctly in the security deposit cases,
one might expect lessors to adjust by amending their lease forms to disclaim any
obligation to invest a security deposit for the lessee's benefit and/or to allocate
any investment return to the lessor. Further, the newly promulgated Uniform
Consumer Leases Act ("UCLA") would establish a baseline rule that the lessor
in a consumer lease has no positive obligation to pay interest on a security
deposit. ' If adopted by ajurisdiction, the UCLA would clearly displace Article
9's more general rules regarding interest on security deposits under consumer
leases. Thus, in the big picture, does it really matter how the courts have
decided these cases?
There are at least a couple of reasons to answer "maybe." First, there are
millions of consumer lease transactions, both with respect to land" 4 and
personalty, and these transactions commonly include security deposits. Not all

B.R. 699, 711 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1996); Florida E. Coast Prop., Inc. v. Best Contract
Furnishings, Inc., 593 So. 2d 560, 562 (Fla. App. 1992); Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. Madison Valley Prop., Inc., 958 P.2d 57, 67 (Mont. 1998); Huffman v. Altec Int'l,
Inc., 546 N.W.2d 162, 165-68 (Wis. 1996).
113. UCLA § 303(d) (2002).
114. The analysis in Part I would apply to a security deposit in a residential lease
to the same extent as a similar deposit in an automobile lease-and accordingly security
deposits in residential leases should also fall within Article 9's scope absent an express
legislative pre-emption. A few cases have concluded that even if a security deposit
generally constitutes a security interest under Article 9, a security deposit in a lease of
land would not-ostensibly because Section 9-104() of the 1972 text (and revised
Section R9-109(d)(1 1)) exclude from Article 9's coverage "the creation or transfer of an
interest in or lien on real estate, including a lease or rents thereunder." See, e.g.,
Demitropoulos v. Bank One Milwaukee, N.A., 953 F. Supp. 974, 981 (N.D. Ii. 1997)
("[R]eal property lease deposits are encompassed by § 9-1046)'s exclusion, while the
automobile lease deposit in this case is not."). Such a conclusion, however, is plainly
wrong. This provision only excludes security interests or liens in real estate-in other
words, a mortgage on land, or a security interest in a lease itself. It would not exclude
any security interest otherwise covered by Article 9 merely because that interest was
created within a lease. For example, if a landlord required its tenant to sign a lease in
which the landlord took a security interest in all of the tenant's assets in order to secure
the tenant's rental obligations, that security interest is plainly governed by Article 9.
Because the tenant's security deposit is a security interest in money, not land, it would
not be subject to the Article 9 "land" exclusion.

HeinOnline -- 68 Mo. L. Rev. 100 2003

2003]

ARE SECURITY DEPOSITS "SECURITY INTERESTS"?

101

jurisdictions will adopt the UCLA or comparable statutes, not all state landlordtenant statutes are clear about allocation of interest earned on security deposits,"'
and some contracting parties will continue to fail to express their intentions with
sufficient clarity to resolve questions about such allocations. As a result, there
will continue to be some number of disputes-and the very existence of contract
law suggests some threshold public interest in how these disputes are resolved.
In this regard, one notable characteristic of the security deposit cases is that they
reflect an uncritical acceptance of the common law no-interest-on-securitydeposits rule as an appropriate baseline rule under contract law. But as
suggested previously," 6 one can argue that in transactions where the lessor is
contemporaneously engaged in large numbers of similar consumer
transactions-such as in cases involving the financing of automobile leases or
the leasing of residential land by developers with significant inventory--"no
interest on security deposits" may not accurately reflect the predicted armslength hypothetical bargain. In recognition of this fact, legislation in many states
has compelled certain lessors to pay interest on security deposits. As such, one
might argue that courts properly can and should reconsider whether evolving
commercial common law should continue to adhere to a no-interest-on-securitydeposits default rule (at least in cases where the lessor holds multiple
deposits).'
Second, although the answer to the question "Why have courts so
egregiously misinterpreted Article 9?" may not be clear, the answer may be quite
relevant depending upon what that answer is. One possible answer is that
despite the drafters' best efforts at producing coherence in the drafting of Article
9, some courts "just don't get it." There are no systematic empirical studies of
the "accuracy" of decisions in Article 9 cases, but all of us who teach Article 9
have often read an opinion and ended up shaking our heads in disbelief,
mystified as to how the court possibly could have screwed up so badly." 8 Many

115. See supra note 67.
116. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text. I do not suggest that such a
reconsideration should necessarily result in rejecting the traditional no-interest-onsecurity-deposits default rule. The difficulties associated with drawing lines
circumscribing those in the "business" of leasing may well justify a conclusion that
rejection of the default rule should occur only through legislative action. But the
question at least seems worthy of further exploration.
118. Sadly for teachers, the Article 9 revisions overruled most of our favorites,
somewhat mooting their usefulness as teaching vehicles. We should not fear, though;
undoubtedly, some judges will prove just as "up to the task" of misinterpreting revised
Article 9. For example, the Eleventh Circuit recently held that under Florida law, title to
collateral passed to the secured party upon repossession-prior to sale-and that nothing
in Florida's version of Article 9 conflicted with this conclusion. Really, that's what they
said-to quote Dave Barry, "I am not making this up." See for yourself. In re Kalter,
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(but not all) of these decisions are federal cases, where one might initially expect
better judging and better lawyering. "9
In once discussing some of the federal decisions with my friend and former
Missouri colleague, Chris Guthrie, he half-jokingly (at leastIhope half-jokingly)
proposed an explanation that I dubbed the Guthrie Hypothesis in his honor-that
federal judges disproportionately have clerks from elite law schools, where
students don't take a UCC course and thus would be most likely to misinterpret
it in drafting opinions. While clever-and perhaps accurate as far as the study
of the UCC at some elite law schools-the Guthrie Hypothesis presents an
unlikely explanation for the security deposit cases. A cursory reading of some
of the security deposit cases suggests that they were not a product of bad
lawyering-lawyers for the plaintiffs put forward arguments similar to the ones
presented in Part I of this article, to little apparent avail. The horses were led to
water, but simply refused to drink.
So in considering the security deposit cases, I began to ponder a different
hypothesis. What did these courts hope to gain by excluding security deposits
from Article 9, rather than deciding the cases on the merits of the lessor's
conduct (as suggested in Part I)? If the cases were decided on the merits, each
case would require discovery regarding the lessor's actual handling of security
deposits (i.e., did the lessor earn interest on security deposits that would
presumptively be payable to lessees under Section 9-207?) before the case could
be resolved. 2 0 In contrast, if the court concluded that Article 9 excluded security
deposits from its scope and instead concluded that a lessor has no common law
duty to pay interest on security deposits, the court could dispose of a security
deposit case on the pleadings-both clearing the case off its docket and
effectively discourage the filing of any future case involving entitlement to
interest on security deposits under Section 9-207.
In this regard, it is important to recognize that a security deposit case
presents the quintessential "small-dollar" consumer class action. At most, any
individual lessee has only a few dollars at stake.' 2 ' Thus, a security deposit case
will proceed only if an attorney expends the time and effort to identify and
assemble a class of similarly-situated plaintiffs-and in reality, the attorney may
be the only party who will enjoy any significant economic benefit from the

292 F.3d 1350, 1353-60 (1 th Cir. 2002).
119. Indeed, while not all of the security deposit cases are federal cases, see supra
notes 3-9, many of the state court decisions have cited and relied upon the federal court
decisions. Thus, it is arguable that the federal security deposit cases have been most
influential in the resolution of these disputes.
120. This inquiry would be obviated, of course, if the lessor's form lease
disclaimed any obligation to pay interest on security deposits.
121. See supra note 15.
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litigation. 122 Indeed, as the class action has become increasingly prevalent over
the past two decades, there has been increasing criticism that prosecution of
"small-dollar" consumer class action cases-where recovery by individual class
plaintiffs is likely to be trivial-is primarily rent-seeking behavior by attorneys
seeking to manufacture fee claims. 23 This has led some to argue that
prosecution of small-dollar consumer class action cases is socially wasteful and
that the law should impose substantive and procedural constraints to prevent or
discourage such cases. To date, however, efforts to effect legislative reform
have failed. 24 Thus, in considering the security deposit cases, I began to
speculate whether courts are simply using their power to interpret statutes as a
means to effect law reform-that is to say, are the courts misinterpreting Article
9's scope as a means to dismiss security deposit cases because they perceive such
complaints as abusive attorney rent-seeking? Might the security deposit cases
reflect conscious or unconscious judicial bias against the litigation of smalldollar consumer class action disputes? Part II explores these questions, tracing
the historical development of consumer class actions'25 and the extent to which
courts have used unorthodox and/or debatable statutory interpretation techniques
26
to dismiss or hinder consumer class actions in other contexts.
A. The Early Nature and History of Consumer Class Actions
Inevitably, the security deposit cases arise as consumer class action
disputes. Given the economics facing any individual lessee, this is not a surprise.
In our litigation system, some persons who suffer legal injury cannot obtain
effective redress because the cost of pursuing it would exceed the amount those
persons could reasonably expect to recover through litigation. 27 Where an actor
causes numerous persons to suffer similar injuries-for example, where Ford
Motor Credit refuses to reimburse to lessees interest that it allegedly owes to
those lessees on their security deposits-public agencies could theoretically
address this problem through aggressive regulatory enforcement designed to
deter the harm-causing conduct. In practice, however, regulators often lack

122. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
123. See infra note 151.
124. See infra notes 138-56 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 127-56 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 157-92 and accompanying text.
127. With respect to small-dollar claims, this phenomenon is largely a by-product
of the American rule, under which the court lacks authority to award legal fees to a
litigant (regardless of outcome) absent statutory authority or express contractual
agreement. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975); Barnes v. Okla. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 11 P.3d 162, 178-79 (Okla. 2000).
By contrast, a "loser-pays" litigation system could ameliorate (in part) the cost barrier to
pursuit of small-dollar claims.
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sufficient funding to pursue aggressive enforcement efforts, or simply choose not
to do so.'28 Under such circumstances (and in the absence of fee-shifting
regimes), injurers have a significantly reduced incentive to avoid engaging in
injurious conduct.
The class action provides a theoretical solution to this otherwise intractable
externalities problem, allowing persons with similar claims to reduce the cost of
obtaining redress by pursuing their claims collectively in one proceeding. 29 In
theory, the class action provides the injured with increased access to the legal
system and deters future injuries by making it more likely that actors will
internalize the costs of their future misconduct. In practice, however, the class
action has become a lightning rod for criticism-much of it alleging that the
class action's structure fosters the objectives of attorney autonomy and
compensation to the extent that it produces socially wasteful litigation.
In contrast to the traditional civil action-in which the client makes critical
decisions regarding pursuit and/or settlement of the action' 3° -the modem class
action is essentially driven entirely by the attorney for the class representative,
for a variety of reasons. First (and perhaps foremost) is the fact that class actions
are almost exclusively contingent fee lawsuits. Even though the class action
enables individual claimants to share the cost of litigation, each individual
claimant would be understandably reluctant to assume joint and several liability
for the cost of attorney fees necessary to certify a class and litigate the claim to
judgment-and particularly so in cases where that claimant's expected recovery
was small or the defendant's liability was not clear.' 3 ' Thus, the attorney for the

128. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler & Thomas D,Rowe, Jr., Beyond "It Just Ain 't
Worth It": Alternative Strategies for Damage Class Action Reform, 64 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 137 (Spring/Summer 2001) ("[D]amage class actions can deter
such injurious behavior and thereby supplement regulatory enforcement by administrative
agencies that are under-funded, susceptible to capture by the subjects of their regulation,
or politically constrained.").
129. Obviously, the class action provides no assistance to the person whose injury
is sui generis. Such a plaintiff cannot overcome the cost barrier to litigation absent the
adoption of some fee-shifting regime such as "loser pays."
130. Technically, these decisions belong to the client regardless of whether the
lawsuit is a traditional civil action or a class action. Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.2(a)-which draws no distinction between class actions and non-class
actions-makes clear that "[a] lawyer shall abide by a client's decision concerning the
objectives of representation ...[and] shall consult with the client as to the means by
which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to
settle a matter." MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003). Nevertheless, for
the reasons discussed in the text, the procedural dynamics and the economics of
consumer class actions combine to give class action attorneys nearly complete authority
in such cases.
131. Presumably, 100 plaintiffs could agree to pay an attorney $100,000 to
represent them in pursuing a collective claim, such that each plaintiff would expect a
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class representative typically (if not exclusively) agrees to represent the plaintiff
class on a contingent fee basis, thereby minimizing the financial risks for the
individual plaintiffs. 3 ' Second, even if a small claimant holds a claim which can
be aggregated with other similar claims, she typically lacks the financial
incentive or wherewithal to invest in identifying the holders of similar claims.
In the typical case, the attorney for the class representative must perform this
function. Third, where individual class members have relatively small claims,
they also have diminished incentive to monitor actively the progress of the case
or the performance of the attorney for the class representative. As a result, "class
actions are effectively run by class counsel" who "exercise virtually complete
control over litigation decisions."' 33
This dominance, and the extent to which courts have structurally reinforced
it, 34 creates significant financial incentives for attorneys to prosecute class
actions in a fashion that may thwart the class action's ostensible objectives.
While the class members would prefer that the attorney for the class act so as to
maximize each member's recovery, the attorney (who principally bears the
financial risk of the litigation) has a conflicting incentive to act in a fashion that
will maximize the fee award. As Deborah Hensler and Tom Rowe have noted,
critics have observed that these conflicting incentives may produce perverse
settlements:
[S]ome plaintiffs' attorneys search out defendants who can be easily
persuaded to settle [nuisance] claims, often earning attorneys' fees that
are disproportionate to the modest effort and expense required to

$1,000 "share" of the bill. The attorney could, of course, agree that each plaintiffs
liability was limited to $1,000; however, that attorney would assume the risk of each
plaintiff's insolvency. As a result, one would expect the attorney representing this class
to insist that each plaintiff be jointly and severally liable for the full fee, thereby shifting
the risk of each plaintiffs insolvency onto the other plaintiffs.
132. Jill E. Fisch, Aggregation,Auctions, and OtherDevelopments in the Selection
ofLead Counsel Underthe PSLRA, 64 LAW &CONTEMP. PROBS. 53,55 (Spring/Summer
2001); George L. Priest, Procedural Versus Substantive Controls of Mass Tort Class
Actions, 26 J. LEG. STUD. 521, 560 (1997).
133. Fisch, supra note 132, at 56.
134. For example, courts have concluded that the class representative does not have
the right to unilaterally replace counsel for the class (as would presumptively be the case
outside the class action setting). See, e.g., Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co.,
67 F.3d 1072, 1078 (2d Cir. 1995); Bash v. Firstmark Standard Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d
159, 161 (7th Cir. 1988). Further, courts have concluded that counsel for the class could
propose a settlement without the approval or consultation of the class representative.
Lazy Oil Co. v. Witco Corp., 166 F.3d 581, 590-91 (3d Cir. 1999); Laskey v. UAW, 638
F.2d 954, 957 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REv. 370 (2000).
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achieve these settlements. Conversely, some defendants who face
stronger claims may seek out plaintiffs' attorneys who are willing to
settle such claims at less than their true value in exchange for fees that
arguably are more generous than they deserve, given what they have
obtained for their class clients. In both instances, the defendants buy
resjudicataat an inappropriate price: In the first instance, they pay
too much (and the plaintiffs' attorneys pocket the premium); in the
second, they pay too little (and class members suffer the loss). In both
instances, because clients in representative litigation usually cannot
effectively control their attorneys, unfaithful plaintiff attorney-agents
are free to pursue their own interests. In addition, the deterrent signals
of litigation are distorted because the costs of the harms that are
imposed on the class are not properly reflected by settlement
outcomes. 3
Furthermore, critics charge that because courts are structurally biased in favor of
settlement, courts are not providing an effective check upon the extent to which
class action settlement decisions may compromise the class action's overall
utility as a representative tool.' 36
These structural problems may produce class action litigation in which class
members have so little to gain that prosecution of the action can be explained
only as an attempt by the class attorney to "create" a fee. Arguably, the lease
security deposit cases fit this model. The typical auto lessee makes a security
deposit of $200 to $800 for a period of two to three years. In a best-case

135. Hensler & Rowe, supra note 128, at 138.
136. As Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have observed:
Unfortunately, judicial approval [of settlements] appears to be highly
imperfect as a protection for the plaintiffs' interests, for several reasons. First,
and most important, thej udge herself has a powerful interest in approving the
settlement. Judges' calendars are crowded with cases, and despite various
reform efforts, the workload only seems to increase. Ifthe judge approves the
settlement, the result will be to remove a potentially complex and timeconsuming case from the judge's calendar; if she rejects it she faces a
substantial probability of further litigation. A judge faces virtually no
prospect of reversal for approving a settlement, whereas a decision rejecting
a settlement might well be appealed. Moreover, trial judges are heavily
conditioned by the ethos of their jobs to view settlements as desirable; they
routinely encourage settlement in other contexts.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney'sRole in ClassAction
and DerivativeLitigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendationsfor Reform, 58 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 45-46 (1991). Macey and Miller further argued that courts often lack
sufficient evidence to conduct an informed evaluation of proposed settlements, and that
parties with objections to the settlement are unlikely to be present at settlement hearings.
Id. at 46-47.
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scenario, individual class members could expect a recovery of $25 or less-with
any such recovery reduced by the class attorney's fee. Settlement would
presumably produce an even smaller recovery for class members. 37 Any
individual class member's recovery would scarcely (if at all) compensate for the
administrative hassle she would incur in identifying herself as a class member.
Further, to the extent that the defendant can effectively pass the cost of litigation
and settlement negotiation on to future consumers, one can argue that settlements
in such cases do not advance the welfare of consumers as a whole. As a result,
one can at least debate whether the small-dollar consumer class action game is
worth the candle, or whether prosecution of such lawsuits is an abuse of the
judicial process.

B. FederalRule 23, Consumer Class Actions, Reiter v. United States,
and Reform Efforts: Does It Matter Whether the Game Is Worth the

Candle?
While the utility of consumer class actions may be a legitimate subject of
debate, Federal Rule 23 did not authorize courts to undertake overt cost-benefit
analysis in deciding whether or not to certify a class. This suggests that
Congress did not sanction the use of judicial authority to make the class action
mechanism unavailable to plaintiff class members suffering an otherwise de
minimis financial injury. Nevertheless, to the extent concerns remain about the
overall welfare effects of these cases, judges Who viewed small-dollar class
actions as socially wasteful might be inclined to interpret the applicable legal

137. In fact, many consumer class action settlements tend to provide compensation
to plaintiffs via "couponing"--under which the plaintiffs receive only credit against
future purchases or services. Such a structure provides minimal or no recovery to the
plaintiff who no longer wished to contract with the defendant, and thus renders the
settlement worthless to many class members. See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, A MarketBased Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REv. 991, 1086-98 (2002) (proposing that courts should police
coupon settlements by approving them only when the class attorney's fee is paid in
coupons as well); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S. Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action
Settlements, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 119-24 (Autumn 1997) (discussing
safeguards that might protect against undesirable coupon settlements).
In its attempts at class action reform, Congress has identified such settlements as
troublesome; its proffered findings in support of the proposed Class Action Fairness Act
of 2002 stated that "[c]lass members have been harmed by a number of actions taken by
plaintiffs' lawyers, which provide little or no benefit to class members as a whole,
including.., plaintiffs' lawyers receiving large fees, while class members are left with
coupons or other awards of little or no value." H.R. 2341, 107th Congress § 2(a)(3)
(2002). As yet, however, reform efforts have proven unsuccessful.
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standards in a fashion that might accomplish the same result--dismissal of smalldollar class action suits-on the merits.
'

The Supreme Court's 1979 decision in Reiter v. Sonotone Corp.'

both

recognizes and ostensibly rebukes such a reaction by federal judges. In that
dispute, Reiter filed a class action suit against Sonotone and four other hearing
aid manufacturers, alleging that they had engaged in price fixing and other
violations of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act' and Section 3 of the Clayton
Act. 4 ° Reiter alleged that these actions forced class members to pay illegallyfixed higher prices for hearing aids and related services purchased from retail
dealers, and sought both treble damages and injunctive relief. Sonotone sought
summary judgment, arguing that Reiter was only a retail purchaser of hearing
aids for personal use and thus lacked standing to sue for treble damages, because
she had not been injured in her "business or property" within the meaning of
Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 4' The United States District Court for the District
of Minnesota held that a retail purchaser of an item suffered injury in "property"
under Section 4 of the Clayton Act if she could show that antitrust violations
caused an increase in the price she paid for the item, 42 but nevertheless certified
this issue for interlocutory appeal, noting the existence of "substantial ground for
' 43
difference of opinion."'

In a unanimous opinion, a panel of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that consumers who allege no injury of a
"commercial or business nature" have not suffered an injury in "business or
property" within the meaning of Section 4. 144 Expressing agreement with several
district court decisions, 45 the Eighth Circuit panel concluded that the phrase
"business or property" limited standing to persons engaged in commercial
interests or enterprises. In bolstering its judgment, the panel expressly
articulated a strong suspicion of the utility of the class action device:

138. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
139. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2000).
140. Id. § 14.
141. "[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States . . . without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000).
142. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 435 F. Supp. 933, 936 (D. Minn. 1977), rev'd,579
F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd,442 U.S. 330 (1979).
143. Id. at 938.
144. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 579 F.2d 1077, 1079 (8th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442
U.S. 330 (1979).
145. Weinberg v. Federated Dep't Stores, 426 F. Supp. 880 (N.D. Cal. 1977);
Gutierrez v. E & J Gallo Winery Co., 425 F. Supp. 1221 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd in part,
vacated in part,604 F.2d 645 (9th Cir. 1979).
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The goals and purposes of the antitrust laws may not be enhanced by
permitting gigantic consumer class actions, many of which are never
tried .... Often, defendants who are unwilling or unable to defend
such suits are compelled for economic reasons to settle actions
otherwise meritless. The result of such settlements will inevitably be
counterproductive when the costs to the defendant of defense and
settlement are passed on to present and future consumers. Moreover,
big firms are better able than small or medium-sized businesses to
defend or settle such claims under similar circumstances. The ultimate
result might be to preserve an oligopolistic economic climate. The
deterrent impact of such suits, in our view, does not outweigh their
potentially ruinous effect on American business.'46
The Eighth Circuit concluded that state attorneys general could act "to protect
the interests of consumers without imposing upon the courts and the economy
the risk and burden of nonmeritorious class actions."' 47
In a unanimous opinion, the United States Supreme Court reversed the
Eighth Circuit and ruled that Reiter had standing under Section 4. Engaging in
what it considered a straightforward interpretation of the statutory language, the
Court concluded that "any person" intuitively included consumers as well as
business persons, and that the term "business or property" should be understood
in the disjunctive.' 48 The Court's opinion is perhaps most noteworthy, however,

146. Reiter, 579 F.2d at 1086. Reiter petitioned for rehearing en banc, which the
court denied over the objection of three nonpanel members, who suggested that the panel
opinion represented "a policy judgment beyond the province of the judiciary." Id. at
1087 (Lay, C.J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
147. Id. at 1086.
148. Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339. The Court stated:
When a commercial enterprise suffers a loss of money it suffers an injury in
both its "business" and its "property." But neither term is rendered redundant
by recognizing that a consumer not engaged in a "business" enterprise, but
rather acquiring goods or services for personal use, is injured in "property"
when the price of those goods or services is artificially inflated by reason of
the anticompetitive conduct complained of. The phrase "business or
property" also retains restrictive significance. It would, for example, exclude
personal injuries suffered. Congress must have intended to exclude some
class of injuries by the phrase "business or property." But it taxes the
ordinary meaning of common terms to argue, as respondents do, that a
consumer's monetary injury arising directly out of a retail purchase is not
comprehended by the natural and usual meaning of the phrase "business or
property." We simply give the word "property" the independent significance
to which it is entitled in this context.
Id. (citations omitted).
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for its stinging rebuke of the Eighth Circuit's narrow policy-based interpretation
of Section 4:
Respondents also argue that allowing class actions to be brought by
retail consumers like the petitioner here will add a significant burden
to the already crowded dockets of the federal courts. That may well
be true but cannot be a controlling consideration here. We must take
the statute as we find it. Congress created the treble-damages remedy
of § 4 precisely for the purpose of encouraging private challenges to
antitrust violations. These private suits provide a significant
supplement to the limited resources available to the Department of
Justice for enforcing the antitrust laws and deterring violations ....
To be sure, these private suits impose a heavy litigation burden on the
federal courts; it is the clear responsibility of Congress to provide the
judicial resources necessary to execute its mandates.
Finally, respondents argue that the cost of defending consumer
class actions will have a potentially ruinous effect on small businesses
in particular and will ultimately be paid by consumers in any event.
These are not unimportant considerations, but they are policy
considerations more properly addressed to Congress than to this Court.
However accurate respondents' arguments may prove to be-and they
are not without substance-they cannot govern our reading of the
plain language in § 4.49
Reiter's language provides strong rhetorical condemnation of judges
adopting strained or counterintuitive statutory interpretation based upon doubts
about the utility of small-dollar class action litigation. Yet the Court also
acknowledged that utility-based criticism of the class action device was "not
without substance." And this criticism grew in volume throughout the 1980s, as
courts experienced burgeoning growth in mass tort class action disputes.
Eventually, the volume of criticism prompted Congress to turn to the Federal
Civil Rules Advisory Committee ("FCRAC") for reform proposals.
In 1996, after six years of study, the FCRAC proposed eight changes to
Rule 23.50 One of these changes-motivated primarily by criticism that judges
frequently certified class actions in cases where class members had little to
gain-would have directed judges to consider in the certification decision
"whether the probable relief to individual class members justifies the costs and
burdens of class litigation."'' This cost-benefit test-dubbed the "it just ain't

149. Id. at 344-45 (citations omitted).
150. Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 167 F.R.D.

559 (1996).
151. Id. For example, one critic offered the following testimony before the
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worth it" rule"'-met with significant opposition, including a letter from 129
law professors who opposed the rule because of their view that the availability
of small-dollar class actions was essential to deter corporate misconduct.'" After
receiving testimony from over 140 witnesses-much of that testimony focused
upon the "it just ain't worth it" rule' 54 -the FCRAC recognized that controversy
over the scope and purpose of Rule 23 was intractable and that further debate

FCRAC:
In many instances, the value of recovery to the individual class member is so
negligible that it fails to offset the associated cost imposed on the defendants
and the judicial system. Those types of claims only enrich the few counsel
whose fees are based on the total aggregation with little or no benefit for the
individual class member.
D. DUDLEY OLDHAM, 4 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES
ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 23 505 (1997), quoted in DEBORAH R. HENSLER
ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 33 &
n. 125 (2000) [hereinafter CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS].
152. Hensler & Rowe, supra note 128, at 142; CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra

note 151, at 31.
153. CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 151, at 31.
154. CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 15 1, at 473 ("The 'just ain't worth it'

rule was a primary focus of debate during the period of public comment on the proposed
revisions, arousing strong support from the business community and strong opposition
from consumer public interest advocates and consumer class action attorneys. It was only
after multiple committee discussions, hours of oral testimony, and hundreds of pages of
written commentary that the committee put aside the proposal to include such a 'costbenefit' test among the criteria for certification.").
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was unlikely to produce consensus on a workable solution. 155 Thus, in October
1997, the FCRAC tabled the proposed Rule 23 amendments.
To date, Rule 23 still contains no formal cost-benefit standard as a predicate
to class certification. While Congress has introduced a number of bills intended
to effect class action reform, none have been successfully enacted, and none have
incorporated cost-benefit analysis as a predicate to certification. 15' Further, while
the U.S. Judicial Conference approved proposed changes to Rule 23 in
September 2002, the proposed amendments focus primarily upon certification
procedures (e.g., the timing of certification and notice requirements), not on the
substantive merits of whether the court should certify a class.

155. CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 151, at 31 ("The effort to amend Rule
23 to include a cost-benefit test for certification foundered on disagreement about the
social value of class actions, particularly lawsuits involving small losses to class
members."); Hensler & Rowe, supra note 128, at 142 (noting political and practical
difficulties that led to abandonment of the cost-benefit standard).
John Frank, a member of the FCRAC in 1996, made the following general
observation regarding the revision effort:
[F]or all our efforts, we do not know whether [the Rule 23(b)(3) class action]
is a good or a bad thing. The great big question is whether the social utility
of the large class action outweighs the limited benefits to individuals, the
aroma of gross profiteering, and the transactional costs to the court system.
On this ultimate question, we are no wiser than we were in the beginning. We
know that the defendants think that they have been blighted, that the
plaintiffs' bar thinks it has done much good and not charged a nickel too
much, and that courts have been busy. We know an important negative: the
wit of man has not devised a better method for compensating large dispersed
losses.
John P. Frank, Whither Rule 23: Memorandum to the Honorable Patrick E.
Higginbotham (April 28, 1995), quoted in CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS, supra note 151,
at 35.
156. The most recent such bill was the proposed Class Action Fairness Act of
2002, H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. (2002). The proposed Act would have enacted a series
of reforms, including (a) a consumer class action "bill of rights" requiring "plain English"
requirements for settlement notices, full disclosure of attorney's fees, and heightened
judicial scrutiny of settlements involving couponing, "bounties" to the class
representative, or discriminatory payments based on the geographic location of class
members; (b) the creation of federal jurisdiction over class actions between diverse
parties with more than $2,000,000 in controversy, with class members being permitted
to aggregate small-dollar claims to satisfy the amount-in-controversy requirement; and
(c) express authorization for the removal of interstate class actions from state courts.
While the House adopted H.R. 2341, the 107th Congress adjourned without further
action on the bill.
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C. Has Anti-Class Action Bias Influenced Statutory Interpretation
Despite Reiter?
When reading the security deposit cases against the backdrop of the debate
over the utility of class actions and the fate of the "it just ain't worth it" rule, one
naturally begins to wonder whether the security deposit cases-and their
incorrect interpretations of UCC Sections 1-201(37) and 9-207-reflect latent
judicial bias against the utility of small-dollar class action suits. Even prior to
Reiter, skeptics offered anecdotal critique that a particular judge's view
concerning the utility of the class action device disproportionately influenced
outcomes:
A class action lawsuit is much like a game of Russian roulette. It
depends almost entirely on the philosophy of the judge trying the
lawsuit. If he thinks class action suits serve a useful social purpose,
then he will find grounds for continuing the action. If, on the other
hand, he thinks the particular case deals with a nit-picking problem of
no social consequence, and if he joins that with a view that class action
lawsuits unnecessarily
clog court calendars, then he will probably
157
dismiss the action.
This observation raises at least two potential (and somewhat related) concerns
with respect to small-dollar class action cases: (a) that judges who frequently
hear these cases may be disproportionately skeptical of the substantive merits of
the claims, and (b) that concerns ofjudicial economy create incentives forjudges
facing such cases to adopt pro-defendant interpretations of procedural and/or
substantive rules in order to clear such cases off their dockets.'
To the extent

157. Eleanore Carruth, The "Legal Explosion "Has Left Business Shell-Shocked,
April 1973, at 66 (quoting G. Edward Fitzgerald of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher).
158. In their empirical study of decisions interpreting the 1995 Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act ("PSLRA"), Joseph Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard labeled these
respective concerns as the "familiarity breeds skepticism" hypothesis and the "docket
control" hypothesis. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple
PersonalityDisorders: The Value ofAmbiguity in StatutoryDesign and Interpretation,
54 STAN. L. REv. 627, 680 (2002). In the consumer class action setting, of course, the
"familiarity breeds skepticism" concept could in some sense subsume the "it's just not
worth it" problem. In other words, a court might be skeptical about a particular consumer
class action case either (a) because it believes that the case lacks substantive merit under
the applicable legal standards, or (b) because it believes that the case may have merit
under the applicable legal standard but "just isn't worth it" given that individual class
members stand to achieve only a de minimis recovery.
The data collected by Grundfest and Pritchard provide some support for the notion
that these skepticism concerns may influence judicial statutory interpretation. In their
FORTUNE,
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that judges perceive that the legislative process has failed to requite legitimate
concerns about the utility and/or abuse of the class action device, might these
judges be exercising "self-help" through statutory interpretation, in order to get
rid of marginal or "economically meritless" consumer class actions? At this
point, available empirical evidence neither confirms nor denies such a
hypothesis, but as discussed below, there is enough anecdotal noise to merit
empirical study.
1. The Lanham Act and Consumer False Advertising Class Actions
As Jean Wegman Bums has shown elsewhere,' 59 skepticism and docket
control concerns have manifestly influenced statutory interpretation in consumer
class action cases seeking damages for false advertising under Section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act. 6 ° Section 43(a) provides that "any person who believes that
he or she is or is likely to be damaged" by a misrepresentation of the
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of goods or services may maintain
a civil action. As Professor Bums and others have argued, most persons would
understand the words "any person" in Section 43(a) to include consumers as well
as the defendant's business rivals. 6 ' Certainly, such an interpretation would
mesh naturally with the Supreme Court's interpretation in Reiter of the identical
words as used in the Clayton Act.'62 Nevertheless, the majority of decisions have

study, Grundfest and Pritchard looked at district court decisions interpreting and applying
the PSLRA's "strong inference" pleading standard in securities fraud class action
litigation. They discovered that variables such as presence of the litigation in the
Northern District of California (where high-tech securities issuers are disproportionately
located vis-a-vis other districts), the intensity of class action securities fraud litigation
within a district, and the intensity of litigation against technology issuers within a district
all correlated significantly with pro-defendant interpretations of the "strong inference"
standard and with pro-defendant rulings on motions to dismiss. Id. at 679-80. Grundfest
and Pritchard observed that such a decisionmaking pattern could be consistent with either
the "familiarity breeds skepticism" hypothesis or the "docket control" hypothesis, but
concluded that their data were more consistent with the former. Id. at 680.
159. Jean Wegman Bums, Confused Jurisprudence: FalseAdvertising Under the
Lanham Act, 79 B.U. L. REv. 807 (1999).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000).
161. Bums, supra note 159, at 877 ("Put simply, the language of [Section 43(a)]
provides for buyer standing, and logically, the goal of consumer protection demands it.");
Andrew A. Gallo, False and Comparative Advertising Under Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Trademark Act, 8 COMM. & L. 3, 15-20 (1986) (decisions denying consumer
standing are based upon incorrect statutory construction and bad policy).
162. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979), discussed supra notes
138-49 and accompanying text. On this theory, the Third and Ninth Circuits initially
recognized consumer standing under Section 43(a). See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648
F.2d 601, 607 (9th Cir.1981) (adopting plain meaning interpretation of Section 43(a));
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denied consumers standing to sue on a variety of theories that reflect implicit
skepticism about the general merits of consumer actions, such as: (1) the entire
statute was intended to protect primarily competitors rather than consumers;163
(2) rivals would be better plaintiffs because of their greater financial resources;164
(3) competitors' victories would inevitably redound to the benefit of any
deceived consumers;' 6 5 and (4) the FTC could seek redress on behalf of
consumers under the FTCA.' 66 Many of these decisions expressly justified their
narrow interpretation (or disregard) for Section 43(a)'s "any person" language
by suggesting that a literal reading would overwhelm federal dockets. 67 Further,
many of the recent decisions have used selective reference to Section 43(a)'s
legislative history to support the view that Congress would not have intended
such a result. Perhaps most illustrative is the Third Circuit's decision in Serbin
v. Ziebart International Corp. The court in Serbin noted that during the

Thorn v. Reliance Van Co. Inc., 736 F.2d 929, 932 (3d Cir. 1984) (same). However,
following the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935
(1988), courts in both circuits have since issued decisions denying consumer standing
under Section 43(a)-even though the operative language of Section 43(a) was not
changed. See, e.g., Barrus v. Sylvania, 55 F.3d 468, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1995); Serbin v.
Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177-80 (3d Cir. 1993).
163. See, e.g., Sandoz Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 902 F.2d 222, 230
(3d Cir. 1990) (Lanham Act is "primarily intended to protect commercial interests");
Colligan v. Activities Club of N.Y., Ltd., 442 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir. 1971) ("Congress'
purpose in enacting § 43(a) was to create a special and limited unfair competition
remedy, virtually without regard for the interests of consumers generally and almost
certainly without any consideration of consumer rights of action in particular. The Act's
purpose ... is exclusively to protect the interests of a purely commercial class against
unscrupulous commercial conduct.").
164. See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 822 F.2d 28, 31 (6th Cir.
1987) ("[C]ompetitors have the greatest interest in stopping misleading advertising, and
a private cause of action under Section 43(a) allows those parties with the greatest
interest in enforcement, and in many situations with the greatest resources to devote to
a lawsuit, to enforce the statute rigorously.").
165. See, e.g., Alpo Petfoods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 720 F. Supp. 194, 212
(D.D.C. 1989) ("While the Act is not directly available to consumers, it is nevertheless
designed to protect consumers, by giving the cause of action to competitors who are
prepared to vindicate the injury caused to consumers.").
166. See, e.g., Colligan, 442 F.2d at 694 n.37 ("Although we hold that consumers
have no right of action under § 43(a), we note that the federal government through the
Federal Trade Commission has intervened in the marketplace and in the courts to
vindicate the rights of the consuming public.").
167. See, e.g., id. at 693 ("[Consumer suits] would lead to a veritable flood of
claims brought in already overtaxed federal district courts."); Maguire v. Sandy Mac, Inc.,
145 F.R.D. 50, 53-54 (D.N.J. 1992) (denying class certification, the court also noted that
"one problematic consequence of extending Lanham Act coverage to consumers would
be the transformation of the federal court system into a veritable small claims court").
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legislative process leading to the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988-in
which Congress made no actual change in the relevant language of Section
43(a)-the House Judiciary Committee had favorably reported a bill that would
have amended Section 43(a) to read "any person, including a consumer." 161
Noting that the conference committee deleted the "including a consumer"
language, the Third Circuit concluded that the deletion provided persuasive
evidence of Congress's intent to accept existing judicial interpretations of
Section 43(a) denying consumer standing. In further support of this conclusion,
the Third Circuit cited a floor statement in which Representative Fish explicitly
raised docket control concerns:
I would like to comment on one provision which was taken out of H.R.
5372 which was reported by the Judiciary Committee and which is not
found in this compromise, it would have provided consumers with
standing to sue under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. This
provision, which had not been studied or evaluated by anyone for its
long-term effects on Federal unfair competition law, would have
radically altered the nature of the Lanham Act and would have had the
likely effect of turning the Federal courts into a small claims court.'69
Explicitly using "docket control" concerns as an interpretive tool, the Serbin
court concluded that "if Congress had intended to make the additional
commitment involved in recognizing a federal tort of misrepresentation and in
bestowing access to federal fora without regard to the amount in issue, we are
confident that the legislative history of the Lanham Act would have borne clear
witness to that commitment." "7°
There are two problems with the Serbin court's analysis. First, the analysis
is premised on the assumption that pre-1988 case law on consumer standing was
settled-and thus that the 1988 amendments embraced that settled principle. But
pre-1988 case law was most certainly not settled; at least two circuits had
recognized consumer standing in Section 43(a) cases. 7' Thus, Congress's
"removal" of the "including a consumer" language is also quite consistent with
the view that the language was superfluous because "any person" already
included consumers. Second, the Serbin court simply fails, without explanation,
to acknowledge the profound inconsistency between its interpretive methodology
and that of the Supreme Court in Reiter-in which the court interpreted the same
words "any person" to include consumers when used in Section 4 of the Clayton
Act. The same policy-based concerns about overburdening the federal

168.
169.
170.
171.

H.R. REP. No. 100-1028, at 32 (1988).
134CONG. REc. 31,854 (Oct. 19, 1988).
Serbin v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1178 (1993).
See supra note 162.

HeinOnline -- 68 Mo. L. Rev. 116 2003

2003]

ARE SECURITY DEPOSITS "SECURITY INTERESTS"?

117

courts-rejected by the Supreme Court as a legitimate interpretive tool in
Reiter-predorrminatethe court's reasoning in Serbin."'
The point is not to debate the wisdom of federal jurisdiction over consumer

class actions asserting false advertising. Instead, the point is that Serbin
followed fourteen years ofpost-Reiterexperience with the perceived abuse of the
class action device, and failed legislative attempts to revise Rule 23 to address
this perceived abuse.
Decisions like Serbin may reflect that some
judges-suspicious of the economic utility of consumer class action cases and/or
frustrated over Congress' failure to satisfactorily address perceived abuses-may
respond by "self-help" and use unorthodox interpretation (or simple disregard)
of statutory language as a tool to dispose of those cases.
2. Aggregation of Individual Claims in Diversity Actions
Another example involves the manner in which federal courts have treated
the aggregation of individual claims in diversity actions. If one or more
members of a purported class have individual claims that satisfy the amount in
controversy requirement, but other class members do not, can a federal district
court assert supplemental jurisdiction over the otherwise noncompliant claims?
In 1969, in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., Justice Brennan argued that
federal courts should assert ancillary jurisdiction over such small-dollar class
action claims in order to provide for the efficient resolution of such disputes:
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) are equally appropriate for such
treatment. There are ample assurances, in the provisions of the Rule
that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
(must) predominate over any questions affecting only members," to
guarantee that ancillary jurisdiction will not become a facade hiding
attempts to secure federal adjudication of nondiverse parties' disputes
over unrelated claims. And the practical reasons for permitting
adjudication of the claims of the entire class are certainly as strong as
those supporting ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims
and parties that are entitled to intervene as of right. Class actions were
born of necessity. The alternatives were joinder of the entire class, or
redundant litigation of the common issues. The cost to the litigants
and the drain on the resources of the judiciary resulting from either
74
alternative would have been intolerable.1

172. Bums, supra note 159, at 878-79 (noting that such a "result-oriented view"
both constitutes "an outright disregard for statutory language" and conflicts with Reiter's
interpretive guidelines).
173. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
174. Id. at 306-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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Nevertheless, a majority of the Court in Zahn concluded that the claim of each
individual class member had to satisfy the requisite amount in controversy (then
$10,000) in order to establish federal diversity jurisdiction, and that federal
courts had to dismiss the claim of any would-be class member that individually
lacked the requisite amount in controversy.175 The result in Zahn effectively
barred from federal courts any class action disputes not raising federal questions,
at least where the proposed class included small-dollar claimants.
In 1990, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Finley v. United
States'7 6 -which reiterated the Court's unwillingness to use supplemental
jurisdiction as a basis for asserting jurisdiction over pendent parties--Congress
enacted a new supplemental jurisdiction statute in response to a recommendation
of the Federal Courts Study Committee. The statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, provides
in pertinent part:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on [diversity], the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) over claims by
plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14, 19, 20, or 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons
proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules, or
seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be
inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements [for diversity
jurisdiction]."'
A facial reading of these provisions appears to permit supplemental jurisdiction
over the claims of small-dollar class plaintiffs if at least one class member
satisfies the amount in controversy requirement. Section 1367(a) codifies the

175. "Each plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional
amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the case-'one plaintiff
may not ride in on another's coattails."' Id. at 301 (quoting from the Second Circuit's
decision dismissing the claims of small-dollar class members).
176. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
177. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a)-(b) (2000).
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"common nucleus of operative fact" test articulated by the Court in UnitedMine
Workers v. Gibbs"' for establishing jurisdiction over pendent state claims. By
definition, if the claims of small-dollar class members are sufficiently related to
the class representative's claim so as to qualify the class for certification-if
there are questions of law or fact that are common to the claims of all putative
class members-then small-dollar class plaintiffs would satisfy the "same case
or controversy" standard in Section 1367(a). Further, nothing in Section 1367(b)
excepts the class action device, or expressly requires that each class plaintiff
must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. As a result, one adopting
the principles of statutory construction similar to those articulated inReiter might
justifiably conclude that Section 1367(a) overruled Zahn 17 9 -and the Fifth,18
Seventh, 8 ' and Ninth 82 Circuits have so ruled.
Nevertheless, a plethora of district court decisions'83 and appellate decisions
by the Third, 8 4 Eighth,' 85 and Tenth' 86 Circuits have concluded that Section
1367 had no effect on Zahn, and that 28 U.S.C. Section 1332 still required every
individual prospective class member to satisfy the requisite amount in
controversy. Most of these decisions have relied upon Section 1367's legislative
history to justify this conclusion, and-as often happens with legislative
history-the history of Section 1367 contains statements seemingly at odds with
the statutory language. These include a House committee report suggesting that
the statute "essentially restore[s] the pre-Finley understandings of the
authorization for and limits on ...supplemental jurisdiction,"' 87 and that the
178. 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
179. See, e.g., Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering
Diversity: Life After Finley and the Supplemental JurisdictionStatute, 40 EMORY L.J.
445,485 (1991) ("[I]f a named class representative's claim invoked diversityjurisdiction,
the statute would appear to permit supplemental jurisdiction over claims by class
members that did not meet the amount-in-controversy requirement."); see also Thomas
C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the
Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963, 981 (1991); Joel E. Tasca,
Comment, JudicialInterpretationof the Effect ofthe Supplemental JurisdictionStatute
on the Complete Amount in Controversy Rule: A Casefor Plain Meaning Statutory
Construction,46 EMORY L.J. 435, 436 (1997).
180. In re Abbott Lab., 51 F.3d 524, 528-29 (5th Cir. 1995).
181. Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 930-31 (7th
Cir. 1996).
182. Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 939-40 (9th Cir. 2001).
183. See Tasca, supra note 179, at 452-53 nn.93-102 (collecting cases).
184. Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d Cir.

1999).
185. Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 961-62 (8th Cir. 2000).
186. Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 638-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
187. H.R. REP. No. 101-734 at 28 (1990), reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. 6860,
6874.
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statute "is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements.., in diversity'
only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley."188
Commentators have disagreed over the appropriate interpretation of Section
1367,"89 and the Supreme Court has not yet resolved this circuit split. 9 '
Although the proposed Class Action Fairness Act of 2002 would have mooted
the issue altogether (by establishing diversity jurisdiction over most consumer
class actions where total claims aggregated $2 million or more),' 9' the 107th
Congress adjourned without passing the bill.

188. Id. at 29, reprintedin 1990 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 6875.
189. Some scholars-most notably Tom Mengler, Stephen Burbank, and Tom
Rowe, who essentially drafted Section 1367-have argued that Section 1367 does not
overrule Zahn. Thomas M. Mengler et al., CongressAccepts Supreme Court'sInvitation
to Codify SupplementalJurisdiction,74 JUDICATURE 213, 215 (1991) ("[T]he legislative
history makes clear that Section 1367 is not intended to affect their [class actions under
Rule 23] jurisdictional requirements.... Thus, the Supreme Court's holdings that...
all class members must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement, remains good
decisional law.").
Nevertheless, in evaluating Section 1367, resort to the legislative history may be
somewhat problematic to the extent that there is no clear consensus about the appropriate
boundary of that history. For example, within the compiled working papers of the
Federal Courts Study Committee comes this gem: "Our proposal would overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Zahn v. International Paper Co., which held that each
plaintiff in a federal diversity action must meet the amount in controversy requirement.
• .. From a policy standpoint, this decision makes little sense, and we therefore
recommend that Congress overrule it." I FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE WORKING
PAPERS AND SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS 561 n.33. Is this part of the legitimate history of

Section 1367, and if so, what does it mean? Subsequent statements by Professors
Burbank, Mengler, and Rowe, supra, suggest that this was not the Study Committee's
official position and should not be viewed as an authoritative portion of the statute's
legislative history. At least one court has explicitly accorded their view substantial
deference in concluding that Zahn survived Section 1367. See Meritcare, 166 F.3d at
220 n.5. Nevertheless, others have cited this passage as if it was the Study Committee's
position, see Tasca, supra note 179, at 447, and the Ninth Circuit alluded to it in holding
that Section 1367 overruled Zahn. See Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 936-40
(2001).
190. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Free v. Abbott Lab., Inc., but
eventually affirmed the Fifth Circuit's judgment by an equally divided Court and without
issuing a written opinion. 529 U.S. 333 (2000).
191. H.R. 2341, 107th Cong. § 4(a)(2) (2002). The bill would have provided a
$2,000,000 amount in controversy requirement for diversity-based class action suits, and
would have expressly overruled Zahn as applied to consumer class actions: "In any class
action, the claims of the individual class members shall be aggregated to determine
whether the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $2,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs."
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Again, the point is not to suggest that courts acted solely from anti-class
action bias in concluding that Section 1367 had no effect on Zahn. The
appropriate scope of federal subject matterjurisdiction is a controversial subject,
and one might argue that the pro-Zahn decisions primarily advance federalism
concerns rather than anti-class action bias.' 92 Nevertheless, preservation of the
Zahn rule disproportionately impacts small-dollar consumer class action
plaintiffs; further, a court could rather easily articulate federalism concerns to
mask a general utility objection to consumer class actions. Thus, one cannot
entirely dismiss the possibility that judicial interpretation of Section 1367 may
in part reflect lingering judicial concern over the inability of the legislative
process to address perceived class action abuses.
IH. CONCLUSION
More empirical study is needed before making any founded conclusions
about the extent to which anti-class action bias actually influences judicial
interpretation of statutory language. One cannot say with certainty that the
results in the lease security deposit cases are motivated solely by conscious anticlass action bias. Nevertheless, as explained earlier, courts could have resolved
the security deposit cases in favor of lessors without so egregiously
misinterpreting Article 9. The problem is that under a proper interpretation of
Article 9's scope provision, these cases would have required discovery regarding
whether the lessor actually invested the deposit and earned a return covered by
Section 9-207. By excluding security deposits from Article 9 altogether, the
security deposit cases make it possible for similar suits to be dismissed on the
pleadings-effectively reducing (if not eliminating) the likelihood that similarly
situated lessees would file future suits.
Because there is no other functional justification for courts to interpret
Article 9 to exclude coverage of security deposits, reasonable suspicion lingers
that the statutory interpretation in these decisions reflects a bias against the utility
of consumer class actions-which, in the process, inappropriately threatens the
general coherence of Article 9 by manifestly manipulating its scope. Further, to
the extent such bias is operating in consumer class action disputes generally, then
courts are effectively resolving a political question-the desirability of making
available judicial resolution of small-dollar consumer disputes-outside the
political process. In contrast, the preferred approach may be renewed efforts to
debate whether cost-benefit analysis has any appropriate role in judicial
evaluation of small-dollar consumer claims, and (if so) to amend federal and
state rules of civil procedure accordingly.

192. For example, Professor Freer-perhaps Section 1367's most vocal critic-has
argued that Section 1367 reflects an inappropriate anti-diversity bias. Freer, supra note
179, at 471.
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